

A Performance Audit of

Utah's Election System

Addressing Recurring Election Control Issues

Office of the Legislative
Auditor General

Report to the UTAH LEGISLATURE







THE MISSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR GENERAL IS TO

AUDIT · LEAD · ACHIEVE

WE HELP ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVE

Audit Subcommittee

President J. Stuart Adams, Co-Chair
President of the Senate

Senator Kirk Cullimore
Senate Majority Leader

Senator Luz Escamilla
Senate Minority Leader

Speaker Mike Schultz, Co-Chair
Speaker of the House

Representative Casey Snider
House Majority Leader

Representative Angela Romero
House Minority Leader

Audit Staff

Kade R. Minchey, Auditor General, CIA,
CFE

Ryan Thelin, Manager, CIA

Andrew Poulter, Audit Supervisor

Erica Jensen, Audit Staff

Office of the Legislative Auditor General

olag.utah.gov





Office of the Legislative Auditor General

Kade R. Minchey, Legislative Auditor General

W315 House Building State Capitol Complex | Salt Lake City, UT 84114 | Phone: 801.538.1033

Audit Subcommittee of the Legislative Management Committee

President J. Stuart Adams, Co-Chair | Speaker Mike Schultz, Co-Chair

Senator Kirk Cullimore | Representative Casey Snider

Senator Luz Escamilla | Representative Angela Romero

September 15, 2026

TO: THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Transmitted herewith is our report:

“A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System” [Report #2026-28].

An audit summary is found at the front of the report. The scope and objectives of the audit are included in the audit summary. In addition, each chapter has a corresponding chapter summary found at its beginning.

[Utah Code 36-12-15.3\(2\)](#) requires the Office of the Legislative Auditor General to designate an audited entity’s chief officer. We worked with several entities and provide recommendations to each of them. The designated chief officer for each entity is:

Lieutenant Governor Deidre Henderson	Aaron Davidson, Utah County Clerk
Lyman Duncan, San Juan County	Joey Granger, Wasatch County
Clerk/Auditor	Clerk/Auditor

They have been notified that they must comply with the audit response and reporting requirements as outlined in this section of *Utah Code*.

We will be happy to meet with appropriate legislative committees, individual legislators, and other state officials to discuss any item contained in the report in order to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations.

Sincerely,

Kade R. Minchey, CIA, CFE

Auditor General

kminchey@le.utah.gov

AUDIT

Independent, objective, evidence-based reviews that identify opportunities to strengthen performance, accountability, efficiency, and outcomes.

LEAD

A high standard for audit excellence: continuously improving our methods, embracing innovation, and applying the most effective tools and techniques available.

ACHIEVE

Every engagement approached with determination, professionalism, and a commitment to overcoming challenges in pursuit of meaningful improvements.

***Audit. Lead. Achieve.** These principles reflect both what we do and how we do it. We believe every organization can improve, and we can help. Our goal is to provide decision-makers with actionable information that supports continuous improvement, informed governance, and long-term success. To meet this goal, our findings must be objective, independent, and grounded in evidence. We design recommendations to be constructive, practical, and focused on helping organizations build upon their strengths. Our audits are designed to help policymakers better serve the people of Utah.*

What Election Officials Are Doing Well

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor (LG's Office) has taken meaningful steps to improve Utah's election system. Over the course of several election audits, the LG's Office has clarified election officials' roles, improved voter roll maintenance, provided standardization among clerks, and improved election controls in Utah. The LG's Office has been thoughtful and diligent in improving the election system, including significantly reducing duplicate and deceased voters on Utah's voter rolls. In turn, county clerks have worked to adapt and implement changing election laws and requirements. Generally, the county clerks we reviewed in this report (San Juan, Utah, and Wasatch) administer elections well. They are compliant with some recommendations from our past audits, showing understanding of election processes such as post-election audits, chain of custody, and reconciliation. We repeat what we have said in the past—that we did not observe significant fraud in Utah's election system.

How This Report Supports Improvement

Despite compliance with some recommendations from our past audits, we also observed repeated errors from past audits among the county clerks we reviewed. Most of these shortcomings are relatively minor, but the clerks still need to address them to maximize election controls. Clerks need to fully implement remaining recommendations from our past audits. Some shortcomings came from insufficient training or knowledge about changing election requirements. As such, each of the clerks we reviewed should do more to keep up with and implement changes to election requirements. Additionally, the LG's Office has generally taken a limited approach to oversight and can provide more oversight and enforcement through a risk-based compliance framework. This will help the LG's Office reduce the likelihood of repeated errors among clerks and identify clerks that may need more oversight than others.

WE HELP ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVE

olag.utah.gov



PERFORMANCE AUDIT

AUDIT REQUEST

In 2023, the Legislature passed House Bill 269, which requires the Office of the Legislative Auditor General to audit the state's election system and controls every two years. In prior audits, we visited every county. For this audit, we focused on in-depth reviews in San Juan, Utah, and Wasatch counties. We spent time in each county in the weeks leading up to the 2026 Primary Election, on Election Day, and in days following.

BACKGROUND

Our office released reports on Utah's election system in 2022 and 2024. The 2024 audit provided multiple recommendations to county clerks to improve post-election audits, chain of custody, and reconciliation. We followed up on those recommendations in the three counties we evaluated while also examining other election processes. We also include an update on voter roll maintenance and the LG's Office's oversight authority.


ELECTION OFFICIALS HAVE MADE SYSTEMWIDE IMPROVEMENTS, BUT RECURRING ELECTION COMPLIANCE ISSUES PERSIST



KEY FINDINGS

- ✓ The LG's Office Has Made Significant Improvements and Been Thoughtful and Diligent in Improving the Election System. There are Opportunities for the Office to More Fully Use Its Election Oversight Authority to Ensure County Clerk Compliance.
- ✓ Audit Follow-ups Have Helped Correct Deficiencies, But County Election Officials Did Not Fully Implement All Election Changes.

As part of this audit, we conducted an in-depth review of three counties, seen in the figure below.



RECOMMENDATIONS

This report provides recommendations to the LG's Office and the three counties evaluated as part of this audit. The following list is not comprehensive. Full recommendations can be found in each chapter.

- ✓ The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should create and implement a risk-based compliance framework.
- ✓ The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should refine its deceased voter analysis to identify all potential deceased voters.
- ✓ The county clerks we reviewed can improve their efforts to follow and implement changes to election requirements.

 **REPORT
SUMMARY**

Repeated Deficiencies Show the Need for Greater Oversight of Election Compliance

In some cases, county clerks committed similar compliance errors we identified in previous audits. The repeated nature of these errors is concerning, as it shows that clerks misunderstood corrective actions or did not fully address them.

Both the LG's Office and county clerks share responsibility over Utah's election system. The LG's Office oversees the system, providing guidance and support to the county clerks. Clerks must learn and implement election requirements, conducting most of the day-to-day election work. When clerks fall short of their election duties, the LG's Office has statutory authority to enforce compliance.

The LG's Office Has Prioritized Assistance and Support Over Compliance Enforcement

The LG's Office has developed many resources and documentation to support counties in administering elections. The Office has demonstrated a commitment to election integrity. However, it has generally taken a limited approach to oversight, sometimes deferring to county elected officials' implementation decisions rather than actively monitoring and correcting noncompliance. This may contribute to the errors we observed over multiple election audits. Election controls only mitigate the risk of fraud as long they are used properly. Thus, election officials should address repeated shortcomings in election controls.

County Follow-Up Status for 2026

We found that county clerks generally administer elections well in the counties we reviewed. We followed up on recommendations from 2024 and found that they have addressed some but not all of them.

For instance, each county implemented one of two recommendations for post-election audits. And no county fully complied with reconciliation requirements.

Compliance With 2024 Audit Recommendations		San Juan	Utah	Wasatch
	Post-Election Audit Recommendations	1/2	1/2	1/2
	Chain of Custody Recommendations	2/3	3/3	1/3
	Reconciliation Recommendations	0/1	0/1	0/1

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1 Election Officials Have Made Systemwide Improvements, But Recurring Election Compliance Issues Persist.....	5
1.1 The LG’s Office Should More Fully Use Its Election Oversight Authority to Ensure County Clerk Compliance	5
1.2 The LG’s Office Has Provided Stronger Oversight for Voter Roll Maintenance but Can Continue to Improve Its Processes	10
1.3 Audit Follow-ups Have Helped Correct Deficiencies, But County Election Officials Did Not Fully Implement All Election Changes.....	15
Chapter 2 Utah County Can Strengthen Gaps in Election Controls by Better Understanding and Implementing Election Requirements	19
2.1 The Utah County Clerk Should Continue to Improve Processes and Understanding of Election Requirements	19
Chapter 3 Wasatch County Election Processes Fell Short of Statutory Requirements in Some Instances.....	29
3.1 The Wasatch County Clerk Should Improve Its Compliance with Election Requirements	29
Chapter 4 San Juan County’s Recurring Election Deficiencies Stem from Implementation and Compliance Challenges	41
4.1 The San Juan County Clerk’s Office Should Better Monitor and Implement Election Requirements.....	41
Complete List of Audit Recommendations	51
Agency Response Plan	57
Office of the Lieutenant Governor	59
Utah County Clerk.....	69
OLAG Response to the Utah County Clerk’s Audit Response Plan	79
Wasatch County Clerk.....	83
OLAG Response to the Wasatch County Clerk’s Audit Response Plan	89
San Juan County Clerk.....	93






Introduction

Our election audits in 2022 and 2024¹ pointed to many areas for improvement in Utah's election system. We recognize the work that the Legislature and the Lieutenant Governor's Office (LG's Office) have done to address recommendations and strengthen Utah's election system. Such efforts have clarified election officials' roles, improved voter roll maintenance, provided standardization among clerks, and improved election controls in Utah. Still, we found areas where election officials can continue to strengthen election controls.

Our 2024 audit also directed several recommendations to county clerks. In prior audits, we visited every county on Election Day to evaluate election processes. For this audit, we surveyed each county clerk office as part of our risk assessment and then focused on three specific counties: San Juan, Utah, and Wasatch. We conducted an in-depth review of the three counties in the weeks leading up to the elections, on Primary Election Day, and in the days following.



This audit provides follow-up for past recommendations in three specific counties: San Juan, Utah, and Wasatch.



While in those counties, we followed up on the recommendations provided to county clerks in 2024 and reviewed the implementation of new election requirements. As we said in 2024, "While we did not find significant fraud in Utah's election system, the recommendations and findings in this report are needed to ensure continued election integrity." Utah's election controls mitigate the risk of fraud as long as election officials use them properly. Given the errors we continue to see, we believe there is a need for improved oversight of compliance with election requirements.

¹ *A Performance Audit of Utah's Election System and Controls* ([Report No. 2022-17](#)).

A Performance Audit of the Signature Verification Process ([Report No. 2024-16](#)).

A Performance Audit of Utah's Election System ([Report No. 2024-20](#)).



Repeated Deficiencies Show the Need For Greater Oversight of Election Compliance

We found that clerks generally administer elections well in the counties we reviewed. Following up on the same recommendations from 2024 in each county, they are compliant with some but not all of them. For instance, the table shows how each county complies with one of two recommendations for post-election audits. Combined with errors we observed in meeting new election requirements, this shows that election officials can further improve their processes to mitigate risks to election integrity.

Compliance With 2024 Audit Recommendations		San Juan	Utah	Wasatch
	Post-Election Audit Recommendations	1/2	1/2	1/2
	Chain of Custody Recommendations	2/3	3/3	1/3
	Reconciliation Recommendations	0/1	0/1	0/1

Source: Auditor generated based on our observations.

In some cases, clerks repeated compliance errors we identified in previous audits. The repeated nature of these errors is concerning, as it shows that clerks misunderstood corrective actions or did not fully address them. Both the LG’s Office and county clerks share responsibility over Utah’s election system. The LG’s Office oversees the system, providing guidance and support to the county clerks. Clerks must learn and implement election requirements, conducting most of the day-to-day election work. When clerks fall short of their election duties, the LG’s Office has statutory authority to enforce compliance.

The following chapters in this report discuss how both the LG’s Office and county clerks can help further strengthen Utah’s election system. Chapter 1 shows how the LG’s Office can more fully use its enforcement authority to ensure clerks are compliant with election requirements. We believe this is needed given the repeated noncompliance we observed. Chapters 2 through 4 address the noncompliance we saw in Utah, Wasatch, and San Juan counties. Each chapter shows areas where these clerks need to improve and how they can do more to learn and implement changing election requirements.



BACKGROUND

Utah Code establishes shared responsibilities between the Lieutenant Governor's Office (LG's Office) and county clerks for the administration of Utah's elections. The LG's Office oversees the election system while responsibility for day-to-day election administration falls on county clerks. Despite improvements to the system, we observed clerks repeating a few errors identified in previous audits. We also identified areas to further improve voter roll maintenance.

FINDING 1.1

The LG's Office Should More Fully Use Its Election Oversight Authority to Ensure County Clerk Compliance

RECOMMENDATION 1.1

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should create and implement a risk-based compliance framework that includes reviews of county election procedures, identifies potential deficiencies, provides recommendations for improvement, and ensures that clerks implement those recommendations. This process will help provide greater assurance that counties are complying with election requirements.

FINDING 1.2

The LG's Office Has Provided Stronger Oversight for Voter Roll Maintenance but Can Continue to Improve Its Processes

RECOMMENDATION 1.2

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should work with the Office of Vital Records and Statistics to implement identified fixes that will help ensure the LG's Office receives all relevant death records.

RECOMMENDATION 1.3

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should refine its deceased voter analysis to identify all potential deceased voters, provide those to clerks for further review, and verify what the clerks did with those potential deceased voters. This will help ensure the accuracy of Utah's voter rolls.

RECOMMENDATION 1.4

The Legislature could consider providing specific criteria for election officials to follow when removing deceased voters so that election officials have a standardized approach for reviewing potential deceased voters.



CONCLUSION

We commend efforts from the LG's Office and county clerks to address recommendations from our past audits. Given the errors we observed during this audit, however, we believe the LG's Office can more fully use its enforcement authority to ensure county clerk compliance with election requirements. Clerks can also do more to learn and follow election requirements as shown in Chapters 2 through 4.

FINDING 1.3

Audit Follow-ups Have Helped Correct Deficiencies, But County Election Officials Did Not Fully Implement All Election Changes

**NO
RECOMMENDATIONS**





Chapter 1

Election Officials Have Made Systemwide Improvements, But Recurring Election Compliance Issues Persist

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor (LG's Office) has taken steps to exercise its new oversight powers and improve Utah's election system following our office's election reports in 2022 and 2024. Even so, we observed county clerks repeating errors identified in previous audits and struggling to implement new election requirements.² Such deficiencies can reduce confidence in elections and increase the risk of election errors. We believe the LG's Office should provide additional enforcement to ensure county clerks are compliant with election requirements. Doing so could help reduce the risk of deficiencies we've observed during our election audits.

Utah Code establishes shared responsibilities between the LG's Office and county clerk offices for the administration of Utah's elections.³ County clerks are primarily responsible for day-to-day election administration, and the LG's Office provides systemwide oversight to ensure compliance among the clerks. Overall, Utah's election system generally functions well. Both state and county level election officials work diligently to fulfill their responsibilities. We commend efforts from the LG's Office and county clerks to address recommendations from our past audits. Despite these strengths, there are still opportunities to further improve election administration and strengthen the system.

1.1 The LG's Office Should More Fully Use Its Election Oversight Authority to Ensure County Clerk Compliance

The LG's Office has implemented two dozen recommendations from our election audits. The Lieutenant Governor and her staff have been thoughtful and diligent in implementing audit recommendations and improving the election system. This includes being responsive to our requests during audits and even addressing some concerns before we completed our audits. We recognize they have devoted significant time and resources to audits and system




The LG's Office has been thoughtful and diligent in implementing audit recommendations and improving Utah's election system.

² Instead of visiting every county as we have on previous election audits, we chose to do an in-depth review of three counties: Utah (Chapter 2), Wasatch (Chapter 3), and San Juan (Chapter 4).

³ *Utah Code* 20A-1-105 and 20A-1-106



improvements. The following graphic depicts concerns we found in our previous audits and what the LG's Office has done to improve the election system.



Source: Auditor generated based on previous election audits and work to implement recommendations from those audits.

These actions from the LG's Office have helped standardize practices among clerks, better preparing them for election irregularities. We recognize the work the LG's Office has done to improve the election system.

We believe, however, that the LG's Office can take the next step by not only providing resources and training but also enhancing its oversight to reduce the risk of recurring deficiencies. While training and standardization help build knowledge and skills for clerks, oversight is necessary to ensure that clerks correctly implement the training. More direct oversight can help mitigate the deficiencies we have seen since we began our election audits in 2022.⁴



While training is important, the LG's Office also needs to provide oversight to ensure clerks correctly implement it.

The LG's Office Has Prioritized Assistance And Support Over Compliance Enforcement

The LG's Office has developed many resources and documentation to support counties in administering elections. However, the LG's Office has generally taken a limited approach to oversight, sometimes deferring to county elected officials' implementation decisions rather than actively monitoring and correcting


⁴ We explain this in more detail beginning on page 8 of this chapter.



noncompliance. This may contribute to the errors we observed over multiple election audits.

Additionally, discussions with both county clerks and state election staff suggest that the LG’s Office views its role as providing support and guidance rather than actively enforcing compliance. This has been a contributing factor to some deficiencies continuing among county clerks. It should be noted that in cases involving significant noncompliance, the LG’s Office has taken a more active enforcement role. The office has used its oversight and enforcement authority to issue formal reports addressing election administration errors in certain counties and has supported efforts to prosecute violations of Utah election law.

As noted, the LG’s Office and county clerks have a shared responsibility for Utah’s elections. Even so, the Lieutenant Governor is the chief election officer of the state, tasked with overseeing and supervising elections (as shown in the figure below). The LG’s Office has the explicit authority to enforce compliance with election requirements. *Utah Code* specifically requires that the LG’s Office “shall enforce compliance by election officers with all legal requirements relating to elections...”⁵



Source: Auditor generated based on *Utah Code* and past election audits.

⁵ *Utah Code* 20A-1-105(1)(c)



In Chapters 2 through 4, we highlight specific errors clerks have made in election controls over multiple audits, such as reconciliation and chain of custody. As the day-to-day election officials, clerks have direct responsibility for election administration.⁶ That said, the LG's Office can provide stronger oversight to ensure clerks are fully implementing election requirements. We found this to be the case in 2022 and 2024, as shown in the following quotes. Improving oversight and enforcement was also one of the main reasons the Legislature acted on recommendations in our 2022 audit and gave the LG's Office more oversight and enforcement power.



Direct responsibility for election administration falls on county clerks.

Need for Elections Oversight

2022 Elections Audit: "Clarifying the extent of the LG's oversight responsibilities could help to ensure that...control weaknesses do not continue."

2024 Elections Audit: "The LG's Office—in its oversight and enforcement role—should help ensure that clerks are auditing elections correctly."

There is a need not only for training from the LG's Office but also a formal system for evaluating county compliance with election requirements and correcting deficiencies. As an example, in 2024 we recommended that the LG's Office do more to ensure that clerks understand and follow ballot reconciliation requirements (see the graphic on the following page). The LG's Office reported that it trained county clerks and provided a standardized reconciliation form. The LG's Office reviews the form for errors once a clerk submits it.

This year we observed clerks making mistakes in reconciliation that could not be identified through a review of the standardized form; it was best to watch the clerks conduct their reconciliation to see these mistakes. Reconciliation errors can reduce confidence that all ballots were handled and accounted for properly. Since some clerks still made reconciliation mistakes that the LG's Office's review did not identify, the recommendation on the following page remains "In Process" as shown in the graphic. The LG's Office should do more within its statutory enforcement power to fulfill this recommendation by enhancing its reconciliation review.

⁶ More information about county clerk responsibilities is seen in finding 1.3.




Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
#2024-20 – 3.7 – We recommend that the Office of the Lieutenant Governor explore all options within its legal powers to help ensure that clerks understand and follow ballot reconciliation requirements in statute.	In Process

To address broader compliance issues such as this, we recommend that the LG’s Office develop a formalized structure to identify and correct errors in county clerk election processes, fully using its enforcement authority. We recognize that responsibility for correcting these deficiencies also lies on the county clerks. The following chapters discuss how clerks can more fully learn and implement election requirements. Nonetheless, we believe the LG’s Office can provide stronger state-level oversight to ensure compliance.

The LG’s Office Should Create a Formal Oversight and Enforcement Framework to Correct Deficiencies in County Clerk Offices

As we stated in 2022, oversight authority could “empower the [LG’s Office] to not only train counties, but to determine whether they are meeting standards and notify counties of the need for improvement.” Given the recurring errors we have witnessed among clerks, the LG’s Office should create a formalized approach for using its enforcement authority. Doing so can help it know which counties may need more oversight and reduce the likelihood of repeated errors through corrective actions. This approach could be tailored to the needs of the county. The graphic on the right shows how support and enforcement can interplay with each other. The LG’s Office could move the dial between support and enforcement according to the needs of each county clerk.



Source: Auditor generated.

There can be different approaches to doing this. For example, Washington State law⁷ requires the Secretary of State’s Office to visit each county every five years, or as staffing permits. Staff there reported that they visit about five to eight counties each year and conduct “Elections Procedures Reviews” to evaluate the county’s election practices. The LG’s Office could select specific counties each year, on a rotating basis, where they observe election processes and check for compliance.

Another approach could be selecting counties based on risk. The *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (Green Book) describe risk assessment

⁷ Revised Code of Washington 29A.04.570



as a process to identify and manage risks that could prevent an organization from achieving its objectives. In this case, that would be analyzing risks that could prevent election officials from faithfully executing election controls. The LG's Office could create a process to prioritize counties with the most risk and observe their election procedures for compliance.

Instead of prioritizing counties, the LG's Office could prioritize new or critical election processes and analyze those across all counties. Doing so could provide it with insight into which counties need additional oversight.



Whichever framework the LG's Office chooses, the framework should help it know what balance of support and enforcement a county needs.

Whichever framework the LG's Office creates should help it know when to turn the dial towards enforcement to help counties correct deficiencies. As we have shown in our previous audits, there are counties that need more help than others. No election system or process is perfect; however, we have asserted since our 2022 audit that standardization and training need to be followed by oversight. The Green Book also emphasizes the need for regular monitoring

to assess the quality of performance over time and resolve deficiencies. Without such oversight, there cannot be proper communication and training to improve deficiencies.

RECOMMENDATION 1.1

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should create and implement a risk-based compliance framework that includes reviews of county election procedures, identifies potential deficiencies, provides recommendations for improvement, and ensures that clerks implement those recommendations. This process will help provide greater assurance that counties are complying with election requirements.

1.2 The LG's Office Has Provided Stronger Oversight for Voter Roll Maintenance but Can Continue to Improve Its Processes

In line with improving counties' implementation of election rules, the LG's Office can continue to improve its oversight reviews of the voter rolls. We recognize efforts by the LG's Office to improve its voter roll oversight. It has done the following:



	Implemented audit recommendations, reducing deceased and duplicate voter errors.
Started their own quarterly audits of the voter rolls, beyond the statutory requirement for annual voter roll audits.	
	Implemented checks with their data analyst to identify, and help counties correct, duplicate and deceased voter errors.


*Source: Auditor generated based on **Utah Code**, audits and follow-ups, and data from the LG's Office.*

This increased oversight of voter roll maintenance helped improve the rolls for both duplicate and deceased voters. For example, in this review we only found two pairs of potential duplicate voters on the voter rolls compared to several hundred in 2024. The LG's Office has also significantly improved its deceased voter review process since 2024, when we found more than 1,400 potential deceased voters on the rolls. However, we still identified 70 potential deceased voters between August 2024 and February 2026,⁸ indicating that further improvements are needed. One-third of these potential deceased voters were active. That increases the risk of an ineligible vote being cast since active voters are sent a mail-in ballot, but we confirmed that none of these potential deceased voters have received vote credit after their death.

Election Officials Left Some Potential Deceased Voters on the Voter Rolls During Their Reviews

Both the LG's Office and county clerks compare death records to voter records to identify deceased voters, as depicted in the figure on the next page.

⁸ It is possible that not all the potential matches we identified are deceased voters. However, some are likely deceased voters who were on the rolls during our analysis. Some have since been removed.




Source: Auditor generated based on **Utah Code** and past audits.

County clerks are required to remove deceased individuals from the voter rolls when they receive death records.⁹ The LG's Office then analyzes the voter rolls at least 90 days before each election¹⁰ to identify errors such as duplicate and deceased voters. In March 2026, the LG's Office identified multiple deceased and duplicate voters for the clerks to review ahead of the 2026 primary election.

We received death record data from the Office of Vital Records and Statistics (OVRs) to test the LG's Office's analysis. We identified 70 potential deceased voters remaining on the rolls after the LG's Office completed their 90-day analysis. Of these, it appears that election officials did not receive 25 of them from OVRs, as shown in the graphic. This would prevent them from identifying these potential deceased voters. After we informed OVRs of these records, it identified reasons why the LG's Office did not receive them. For example, OVRs reported it had not previously been instructed to share out-of-state death records. OVRs also identified practices to prevent this issue moving forward and the LG's Office plans to work with OVRs on them.

Potential Deceased Voters OLAG Identified



Source: Auditor generated from death record data provided by the LG's Office and OVRs.

*None of these potential deceased voters have received vote credit since their death.

⁹ **Utah Code** 20A-2-504(4)

¹⁰ **Utah Code** 20A-2-502(1)(i)



The remaining 45 potential deceased voters arise from the way election officials compare deceased records to the voter rolls. *Utah Code* simply directs clerks to “remove a voter’s name from the official register...after ...receiv[ing] confirmation...from the Office of Vital Records and Statistics.”¹¹ Clerks take into account different factors, such as whether they can find an obituary, to determine whether a death record matches a deceased voter and should be removed. For these reasons, some potential deceased voters were not removed.

Death Record		Voter Record
First Name	✓	First Name
Last Name	✓	Last Name
Date of Birth	✓	Date of Birth
Social Security #	✓	Social Security #

Death record matched to voter.

Death Record		Voter Record
First Name	✓	First Name
Last Name	✓	Last Name
Date of Birth	✓	Date of Birth
Social Security #	⊘	Social Security #

Death record not matched to voter.

Source: Auditor generated based on analysis of death records and conversations with the LG’s Office.

**The LG’s Office looks for exact and partial matches in their analysis.*

During its 90-day analysis, the LG’s Office looks for possible deceased voters that clerks left on the rolls by matching death records to specific pieces of personal information in voter records, as illustrated in the graphic.¹² This process can also miss some potential deceased voters. For example, if the Social Security number does not match the number in the voter record or is missing, the

LG’s Office’s analysis will not match that death record to a voter, even if the other information matches.

This is likely due to concerns about incorrectly matching a death record to a voter and removing someone who is still alive. We do not want the removal of living voters either, but a missing Social Security number does not mean the death record is not a match for the voter. Therefore, the LG’s Office should identify all potential deceased voters and require clerks to at least review those records in more detail to determine whether they are a match or not. The LG’s Office has already asked clerks to do a similar review with past deceased voter records it sent to the clerks. The LG’s Office reported that it will include the additional potential deceased voters in that process moving forward.

Even if the LG’s Office flags potential deceased voters for further clerk review, some will likely remain on the voter rolls since death records and voter records

¹¹ *Utah Code* 20A-2-504(4). House Bill 361 (2026 General Session) amended this section and now allows clerks to use other reliable information for deceased voter removals. Since that change wasn’t in effect for the time period we reviewed, we only looked at adherence to the previous requirement.

¹² First and last names, date of birth, and Social Security number.



The Legislature could consider clarifying what constitutes a valid match between death records and voter records.

don't always match perfectly. As a result, some clerks choose not to remove a voter when there are discrepancies between the death and voter records. The Legislature recently changed law to allow clerks to use any reliable source or document when reviewing potential deceased voters. If the Legislature wants a standardized approach to removing potential

deceased voters and preventing improper removals, it could consider clarifying what information it would like clerks to match when reviewing potential deceased voters.

RECOMMENDATION 1.2

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should work with the Office of Vital Records and Statistics to implement identified fixes that will help ensure the LG's Office receives all relevant death records.

RECOMMENDATION 1.3

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should refine its deceased voter analysis to identify all potential deceased voters, provide those to clerks for further review, and verify what the clerks did with those potential deceased voters. This will help ensure the accuracy of Utah's voter rolls.

RECOMMENDATION 1.4

The Legislature could consider providing specific criteria for election officials to follow when removing deceased voters so that election officials have a standardized approach for reviewing potential deceased voters.

The LG's Office's Citizenship Review Found a Small Number of Unconfirmed Voters

The LG's Office began a citizenship review of voter records in April 2025, examining over 2 million Utah voter registrations. While the review remains ongoing, the office has been able to confirm the citizenship status of most registered voters. To verify the LG's Office's review, we evaluated the office's methodology and supporting documentation and found its approach appeared comprehensive. This included the LG's Office updating information in thousands of voter records and manually reviewing over 11,000 records.



The review identified 27 confirmed noncitizens on Utah’s voter rolls.¹³ We verified that those individuals were removed from the voter database. The LG’s Office also identified 25 likely noncitizens, along with 5,007 individuals whose citizenship status it could not confirm. The LG’s Office attempted to notify these individuals by mail and requested documentation verifying their citizenship. As of August 31, 2026, county clerks reported that about 1,500 of those individuals provided proof of citizenship. Separately, about 100 of the unconfirmed voters were removed from the rolls, leaving roughly 3,400 individuals whose citizenship status remains unverified.

Until additional information is provided, the citizenship status of these individuals remains unknown. However, the LG’s Office has designated each of these unknown individuals as a federal-only voter,¹⁴ meaning that they may only vote in federal elections and are ineligible to receive ballots for state races.

1.3 Audit Follow-ups Have Helped Correct Deficiencies, But County Election Officials Did Not Fully Implement All Election Changes

Along with improvements in the LG’s Office, we observed county clerks improve their compliance with election laws and rules. However, some clerks we reviewed were unaware of election requirements, which prevented them from fully complying with those requirements this year. We also observed repeated mistakes in areas such as ballot reconciliation and post-election audits (seen in Chapters 2 through 4). The following three chapters provide more detail about counties where we did in-depth reviews. We make direct recommendations to the county clerks to help improve their county’s election processes.

While the mistakes we observed are generally minor, ultimately the clerks we reviewed should take a more active role in keeping up with and implementing election changes. Independently elected county clerks have a shared responsibility for elections and are primarily responsible for day-to-day election administration.


As shown in the figure on the following page, *Utah Code* 20A-1-106 requires clerks to “diligently learn and become familiar with” election laws and rules and comply with them. This is important since election controls work together to reduce threats to elections. If clerks don’t properly implement the controls, it

¹³ The LG’s Office reported that 13 of these individuals voted in elections between 2018 and 2024.

¹⁴ This is in compliance with House Bill 209 from the 2026 Legislative General Session.



weakens how well they mitigate threats and risks having inappropriate or inaccurate election outcomes.



Source: Auditor generated based on **Utah Code** and past election audits.

County clerks' understanding and application of election laws is therefore essential to effective election administration. State oversight can then provide assurance that this understanding is translated into compliant election practices and trustworthy elections. In fact, clerks have responded to some of our recommendations and recommendations from the LG's Office's reviews, showing how an enforcement approach can correct deficiencies. Two of our past audits provided direct recommendations to county clerks, which we followed up on during the 2026 Primary Election. We observed implementation of recommendations directed at specific clerks.



BACKGROUND

During the 2026 Primary Election, we observed several election processes in Utah County. Utah County is the second most populous county in the state. The Utah County Clerk's Office is compliant with most of the 2024 audit recommendations related to post-election audits, chain of custody, and ballot reconciliation. However, we observed some instances where the county clerk and staff did not fully comply with some election requirements.

FINDING 2.1

The Utah County Clerk Should Continue to Improve Processes and Understanding of Election Requirements

RECOMMENDATION 2.1

The Utah County Clerk should ensure they and their staff learn and comply with all candidate nomination petition processing requirements and procedures as outlined in *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. Implementing this recommendation will ensure that the county clerk properly reviews summary sheets and rejects any packets that lack required information.

RECOMMENDATION 2.2

The Utah County Clerk should follow all requirements in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 related to candidate nomination petition signature audits. This should include a written audit policy and the designation of another elected official to conduct audits in a conflicted race. This will help the county ensure that its audits are accurate and enhance independence.

RECOMMENDATION 2.3

The county clerks should work with the Lieutenant Governor's Office to clarify who should take the "Introduction to Ballot Audits" training before participating in post-election audits. Successful implementation will be shown with documentation between the LG's Office and county clerks clarifying who should take the training. This will ensure consistency among clerks in applying training requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 2.4

The Utah County Clerk should provide standardized guidance for what constitutes proof of residence. Implementation of this recommendation includes ensuring that election staff and poll workers follow that guidance to provide consistent requirements across the county.

RECOMMENDATION 2.5

The Utah County Clerk should reinforce in poll worker training that poll workers must complete all necessary tasks for the county's specific ballot reconciliation process. Implementation of this recommendation includes ensuring poll workers complete their assigned tasks at polling locations to help the county reconcile on time. This will foster greater trust and accountability with the handling and processing of ballots, in compliance with election requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 2.6

The Utah County Clerk should document in its daily reconciliation any reasons why the reconciliation is off, if applicable. Implementing this recommendation will help the county ensure it completes reconciliation on time and transparently reports results with supporting details. This can foster public trust in election processes.

RECOMMENDATION 2.7

The Utah County Clerk should develop, document, and implement a systematic method to learn and follow new election requirements. Successful implementation will include a document outlining the clerk's methods for learning election requirements. They should also execute those methods to help reduce the risk of noncompliance and bolster election integrity.

2024 AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

The Utah County clerk should also implement Recommendations 1.1 and 3.6 from our 2024 elections audit, as listed in this chapter.



CONCLUSION

Overall, the Utah County Clerk's Office conducts its elections well. We recognize the substantial efforts of the county clerk and election staff to conduct elections, comply with requirements, and adapt to evolving election laws. The county clerk should continue to seek full compliance with prior audit recommendations and develop a more systematic approach to understanding and implementing new election requirements.






Chapter 2

Utah County Can Strengthen Gaps in Election Controls by Better Understanding and Implementing Election Requirements

As the second most populous county in the state, the Utah County Clerk's Office generally conducts its elections well. We recognize the substantial efforts of the county clerk and election staff to conduct elections, comply with requirements, and adapt to evolving election laws. Nevertheless, we saw instances where the county clerk and staff did not fully comply with some election requirements. This includes not fully complying with past audit recommendations and some new election processes. While many of these issues are relatively minor, they represent opportunities to strengthen election administration within the county. Our 2024 audit found that some clerks had not devoted sufficient time to learn certain election requirements.¹⁵ Given the number of recent changes to election requirements, we encourage the Utah County Clerk's Office to strengthen its processes for staying current with election requirements and ensuring they are consistently implemented.



2.1 The Utah County Clerk Should Continue to Improve Processes and Understanding of Election Requirements

The clerk's office is compliant with most of the 2024 audit recommendations related to post-election audits, chain of custody, and ballot reconciliation, as shown in the figure on the next page. The remaining recommendations are still "In Process."

¹⁵ *A Performance Audit of Utah's Election System* ([Report No. 2024-20](#)), p. 7



Compliance With Past Recommendations		
	Post-Election Audit Recommendations Recommendation 1.1 to implement all requirements is <u>In Process</u> . The county is <u>compliant</u> with Recommendation 1.5 to include outside individuals in the post-election audit.	1/2
	Chain of Custody Recommendations The county is <u>compliant</u> with Recommendation 3.2 to video monitor processing areas, Recommendation 3.8 to implement all ballot pickup and intake requirements, and Recommendation 3.1 to batch immediately.	3/3
	Reconciliation Recommendations Recommendation 3.6 to implement reconciliation requirements is <u>In Process</u> .	0/1

Source: Auditor generated based on our observations.

We also observed that Utah County did not fully comply with some new election requirements, despite the Elections Handbook from the Lieutenant Governor’s Office (LG’s Office) providing some guidance. These issues appear to stem, in part, from insufficient training and awareness of election requirements. We will discuss the various issues we found throughout this chapter.

As noted in Chapter 1, effective election administration requires county clerks to correctly implement election laws and the LG’s Office to provide oversight to ensure compliance. The recommendations are directed to the county, but we believe additional oversight by the LG’s Office can improve the county’s understanding of, and compliance with, election requirements.

The following four sections describe areas of noncompliance we observed in Utah County, with related recommendations to improve its processes:

1. Utah County’s Review of Candidate Nomination Petition Packets Partially Complied with Election Requirements
2. Some Volunteers Did Not Take State-Required Training Before Conducting the Post-Election Audit
3. Inconsistencies at Polling Locations May Have Impacted Provisional Voters
4. Utah County Did Not Reconcile or Document Reconciliation Discrepancies Within the Statutory Timeframe



1. Utah County's Review of Candidate Nomination Petition Packets Partially Complied with Election Requirements

We observed the clerk's office receive and review candidate nomination petition packets. We found that some submissions lacked required information, including a summary list containing contact information of those who gathered signatures. The LG's Office reported that this information can be helpful if they suspect a signature gatherer committed fraud. Utah County recognized that it did not collect the required summary lists for some packets during initial packet submissions. However, the county reports that it identified this concern, made efforts to gather information for the missing lists, and collect lists on following submissions.

Administrative Rule and *Utah Code* designate what information must be in the submissions for a clerk to accept them.^{16,17} Clerks should request any missing information from the candidate; if the candidate cannot provide it, then clerks should reject the packet. For the missing summary lists, Utah County shared documentation with us where it verified some of the missing information from the candidates themselves. In other cases, it reported gathering the missing information from indirect sources instead of from the candidates.¹⁸ It still accepted those packets.

Additionally, the county clerk and elections director did not create policies or procedures to avoid a conflict of interest when processing candidate nomination petitions. The county clerk was on the ballot for this primary election. *Administrative Rule* requires the county clerk to develop a written audit policy and, in a conflicted race, to designate another elected official to conduct the audits for that race.¹⁹



The county clerk voluntarily did not involve himself in the candidate nomination petition audit but should formalize that policy to ensure independence.

The county clerk voluntarily did not involve himself in the candidate nomination petition signature audit. However, rather than a separate elected official, the

¹⁶ *Administrative Rule* 623-4-4(1)(c)

¹⁷ *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3(1)

¹⁸ The clerk's office explained that they verified whether signature gatherers were eligible through either the candidate or indirect sources. They did not collect contact information directly from the candidate for all gatherers, as required in statute.

¹⁹ *Administrative Rule* R623-12-6(2)(a) and (b)



elections director and an elections administrator performed the audit. The clerk's office indicated that it was not aware of the requirements to develop a written policy and to designate another elected official as the auditor in a conflicted race.²⁰

RECOMMENDATION 2.1

The Utah County Clerk should ensure they and their staff learn and comply with all candidate nomination petition processing requirements and procedures as outlined in *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. Implementing this recommendation will ensure that the county clerk properly reviews summary sheets and rejects any packets that lack required information.

RECOMMENDATION 2.2

The Utah County Clerk should follow all requirements in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 related to candidate nomination petition signature audits. This should include a written audit policy and the designation of another elected official to conduct audits in a conflicted race. This will help the county ensure that its audits are accurate and enhance independence.

2. Some Volunteers Did Not Take State-Required Training Before Conducting the Post-Election Audit

The county clerk used volunteers to assist in the post-election audit. The LG's Office reports that all election volunteers must take the state's "Introduction to Ballot Audits" training to participate in post-election audits. Some, but not all, volunteers completed this training. The county reported that unclear direction from the LG's Office contributed to some participants not taking the training. This confusion was also seen in other counties.²¹ While the county performed and documented the post-election audit correctly, this recommendation remains "In Process" due to the lack of required training among some who performed it.

²⁰ Upon further discussion, the county clerk felt the requirement was unclear and did not have a plan to designate another elected official to conduct audits for a conflicted race.

²¹ San Juan and Wasatch counties were unaware of this requirement. See Chapters 3 and 4 for more details.



The LG’s Office and county clerks should clarify expectations about who needs to take this training. Without adequate training, audit results may be unreliable and increase the risk that errors may go undetected.

	2024 Post-Election Audit Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
#2024-20 – 1.1 – We recommend that, as election officials, Utah’s county clerks learn and execute all post-election audit process requirements and procedures.		In Process

RECOMMENDATION 2.3

The county clerks should work with the Lieutenant Governor’s Office to clarify who should take the “Introduction to Ballot Audits” training before participating in post-election audits. Successful implementation will be shown with documentation between the LG’s Office and county clerks clarifying who should take the training. This will ensure consistency among clerks in applying training requirements.

3. Inconsistencies at Polling Locations May Have Impacted Provisional Voters

On Primary Election Day, we observed that poll workers across the county varied in the documents they would accept for provisional ballots. An individual may cast a provisional ballot if they provide valid voter identification and proof of residence to the poll worker at a polling location.^{22,23} Some poll workers accepted certain documents as proof of residence, while others rejected those same documents. This inconsistency may have impacted voters’ ability to register and cast a ballot. While statute provides some discretion on how individuals can provide proof of residence,²⁴ we don’t believe voters in the same county should face different requirements depending on the polling location.

²² An individual may cast a provisional ballot for several reasons, including registering to vote for the first time.

²³ *Utah Code* 20A-2-207(1). There are other qualifications to cast a provisional ballot.

²⁴ *Utah Code* 20A-2-105



For instance, some poll workers accepted bank statements for proof of residence, while others did not. This inconsistency may have come from new requirements in law,²⁵ which removed bank statements from the list of valid voter identification. However, voters could still use them for proof of residence. Due to this confusion, we observed an instance where provisional voters faced different proof of residence requirements at different polling stations. We recommend that the Utah County Clerk's Office provide standardized guidance to its election workers for what constitutes proof of residence.

RECOMMENDATION 2.4

The Utah County Clerk should provide standardized guidance for what constitutes proof of residence. Implementation of this recommendation includes ensuring that election staff and poll workers follow that guidance to provide consistent requirements across the county.

4. Utah County Did Not Reconcile or Document Reconciliation Discrepancies Within the Statutory Timeframe

During our observations on Election Day, Utah County did not explain or document why its ballot reconciliation did not balance. We later asked for documentation to verify that the county completed its Election Day reconciliation but did not receive it. Reconciliation is a critical control meant to identify discrepancies and verify that the county correctly processed and accounted for all ballots. Delayed reconciliation could impact trust and transparency in elections, particularly if the county does not document or report reconciliation discrepancies. The county clerk should work to reconcile in a timely fashion and document that reconciliation for future elections. This will help them meet the statutory requirement that clerks complete reconciliation and publicly release results each day they tabulate ballots.



Utah County did not document the reasons its ballot reconciliation did not balance on Primary Election Day.

We recognize that Utah County was able to eventually reconcile after Election Day. The Utah County Clerk explained that he conducts his own reconciliation process beyond what statute requires. He reported that this may have

²⁵ Senate Bill 194 (2026 General Legislative Session)



contributed to the delay in reconciliation. In a follow-up conversation, the county clerk and elections director reported that two polling locations neglected to submit in-person vote counts on election night. This likely contributed to why the county could not complete their specific reconciliation process on Election Day. Because of these concerns, we consider the follow-up status of this recommendation to be “In Process.”

	2024 Reconciliation Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
#2024-20 – 3.6 – We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they understand and follow the ballot reconciliation process in <i>Utah Code</i> 20A-4-109.		In Process

RECOMMENDATION 2.5

The Utah County Clerk should reinforce in poll worker training that poll workers must complete all necessary tasks for the county’s specific ballot reconciliation process. Implementation of this recommendation includes ensuring poll workers complete their assigned tasks at polling locations to help the county reconcile on time. This will foster greater trust and accountability with the handling and processing of ballots, in compliance with election requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 2.6

The Utah County Clerk should document in its daily reconciliation any reasons why the reconciliation is off, if applicable. Implementing this recommendation will help the county ensure it completes reconciliation on time and transparently reports results with supporting details. This can foster public trust in election processes.

The Utah County Clerk Should Do More to Systematically Learn and Implement Changes to Election Requirements

Overall, the Utah County Clerk does not have a systematic approach to review or learn election requirements. We believe this contributed to the various instances of partial compliance discussed in this chapter. It is also concerning, given clerks have the statutory duty to learn and comply with election requirements.²⁶

²⁶ *Utah Code* 20A-1-106



Election requirements help safeguard the accuracy and integrity of elections but only work to the extent that counties correctly execute them. Therefore, a systematic approach to learning election requirements could help the county clerk and staff further fulfill their statutory responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION 2.7

The Utah County Clerk should develop, document, and implement a systematic method to learn and follow new election requirements. Successful implementation will include a document outlining the clerk's methods for learning election requirements. They should also execute those methods to help reduce the risk of noncompliance and bolster election integrity.



BACKGROUND

We followed up on recommendations we gave to county clerks in 2024 and reviewed other election processes. This chapter highlights several relatively minor shortcomings in processes such as chain of custody, reconciliation, and election audits in the Wasatch County Clerk's Office.

FINDING 3.1

The Wasatch County Clerk Should Improve Their Compliance with Election Requirements

RECOMMENDATION 3.1

The Wasatch County Clerk should learn and execute all election audit requirements as outlined in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 and the Elections Handbook. Successful implementation will include properly attesting to the audit results, completing required training, and ensuring a single auditor does not perform the entirety of an audit. Doing so will help post-election audits meet expectations for independence, and address training for those conducting the audits.

RECOMMENDATION 3.2

The Wasatch County Clerk should adjust their election processes to mitigate the chances that someone can vote twice. This will further strengthen existing controls against double votes.

RECOMMENDATION 3.3

The Wasatch County Clerk should learn and execute all processing requirements for candidate nomination petitions as outlined in *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. This will ensure the clerk collects summary sheets with all required information and processes packets in contested races as required in *Administrative Rule*. This enhances independence of the process and can facilitate signature gatherer investigations if needed.

RECOMMENDATION 3.4

The Wasatch County Clerk should work with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to identify ways in which they need help learning and implementing new election requirements. The clerk should then implement a formal system to learn and implement changes to election requirements. This will help ensure the county's election processes are in line with the most recent election requirements, bolstering the security and integrity of elections.

2024 AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

The Wasatch County clerk should also fully implement Recommendations 1.1, 3.2, 3.6, and 3.8 from our 2024 elections audit, as listed in this chapter.



CONCLUSION

Noncompliance with election law increases the risk of inaccurate or inappropriate election outcomes. While election processes are generally sound in Wasatch County, the clerk can do more to monitor and implement changing election requirements given an unawareness or misunderstanding of some changes. We provide several recommendations to address this concern.






Chapter 3

Wasatch County Election Processes Fell Short of Statutory Requirements in Some Instances

The Wasatch County Clerk²⁷ has made some improvements since our 2024 audit and generally conducts sound elections. We recognize the significant efforts required from county clerks to administer elections, comply with election laws and rules, and fulfill their other official responsibilities. However, we still observed some areas where the county was noncompliant with election law or did not fully implement recommendations from previous audits. This chapter highlights several shortcomings in election processes such as chain of custody, reconciliation, and post-election audits. Most of these shortcomings are relatively minor but should still be addressed to maximize election controls. We believe the county can address these issues by fully complying with audit recommendations and staying current with changes in election laws and requirements.



3.1 The Wasatch County Clerk Should Improve Its Compliance with Election Requirements

As part of this 2026 audit of Utah's election system and controls, we followed up on recommendations we gave to county clerks in our previous 2024 audit to measure compliance. The figure on the next page shows Wasatch County's compliance with previous audit recommendations:

²⁷ Although the clerk and auditor offices are combined in Wasatch County, we will refer to the election official only as clerk throughout this chapter because that is the role by which they have authority and responsibility over elections.



Compliance With Past Recommendations		
	Post-Election Audit Recommendations Recommendation 1.1 to implement all requirements is <u>In Process</u> . The county is <u>compliant</u> with Recommendation 1.5 to include outside individuals in the post-election audit.	1/2
	Chain of Custody Recommendations Recommendation 3.2 to video monitor processing areas is <u>In Process</u> . Recommendation 3.8 to implement all ballot pickup and intake requirements is <u>In Process</u> . The county is <u>compliant</u> with Recommendation 3.1 to batch immediately.	1/3
	Reconciliation Recommendations Recommendation 3.6 to implement reconciliation requirements is <u>In Process</u> .	0/1

Source: Auditor generated based on our observations.

Beyond previous recommendations, we also wanted to determine whether clerks are consistently implementing new election requirements. We found that Wasatch County failed to implement some recent changes to election requirements, despite the Lieutenant Governor's Office (LG's Office) including guidance on these changes in the Elections Handbook. This finding suggests either that the county did not reference the Elections Handbook or that it did not fully understand the requirements.



This report identifies several areas of noncompliance and recommendations to correct them.

As noted in Chapter 1, effective election administration requires both county clerks to correctly implement election laws and the LG's Office to provide oversight to ensure compliance. The following five sections describe areas of noncompliance we observed in Wasatch County and provide recommendations to improve its processes in the following order:

1. Wasatch County Did Not Meet All New Election Audit Requirements
2. Wasatch County's Video Monitoring Does Not Meet Statutory Requirements
3. Wasatch County Should Use Required Security Seals During Ballot Pickup
4. Wasatch County Can Further Comply with Reconciliation Requirements
5. Wasatch County Can More Fully Follow Candidate Nomination Petition Processing Requirements



While these recommendations are directed to the county clerk, we believe additional oversight by the LG’s Office can improve the county’s understanding of, and compliance with, election requirements.

**1. Wasatch County Did Not Meet
All New Election Audit Requirements**

Wasatch County correctly performed its post-election ballot audit but did not properly implement certain attestation requirements, despite the LG’s Office clarifying expectations in *Administrative Rule*.²⁸ In our 2024 elections audit, we found confusion among clerks about how to attest to their audit results. Both the county clerk and the individuals²⁹ who perform election audits should fill out documentation reporting information such as who performed the audit, what the results were, and whether auditors completed the required training. Wasatch County filled out the election officer’s attestation form, but the forms for the audit participants did not contain the required information. Audit participants also did not complete the required training.³⁰

In the 2026 Primary Election, Wasatch County also did not have two auditors conduct its 1% ballot signature audit, as required,³¹ and reported doing the audit inconsistently. These shortcomings weaken audit independence and reduce its ability to identify and correct errors. While the county performed other parts of its election audits correctly, it can still address the errors mentioned. Thus, we consider the following 2024 recommendation “In Process.” The county should continue to implement it.

 2024 Post-Election Audit Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
#2024-20 – 1.1 – We recommend that, as election officials, Utah’s county clerks learn and execute all post-election audit process requirements and procedures.	In Process

²⁸ *Administrative Rule* R623-12-3

²⁹ *Administrative Rule* R623-12-3(8)(9)

³⁰ As noted in Chapter 2, we recognize there was confusion among multiple county clerks about who was required to take this training.

³¹ *Administrative Rule* R623-12-3(3)



RECOMMENDATION 3.1

The Wasatch County clerk should learn and execute all election audit requirements as outlined in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 and the Elections Handbook. Successful implementation will include properly attesting to the audit results, completing required training, and ensuring a single auditor does not perform the entirety of an audit. Doing so will help post-election audits meet expectations for independence, and address training for those conducting the audits.

2. Wasatch County's Video Monitoring Does Not Meet Statutory Requirements

While the county improved video surveillance since 2024, we still found one room where ballots were processed that did not have proper camera monitoring. This room is connected to the main ballot processing area, which was monitored by video surveillance. Election workers first counted ballots in the monitored processing room and then transported them to the adjacent room for scanning, where video monitoring was not used. We recognize that the county used two election workers to handle ballots in this room, who then returned the ballots to the main processing room after scanning. Even so, a lack of proper monitoring creates the opportunity for an election worker to be alone with ballots. We have already seen the importance of camera monitoring in another county. In that case, the county attorney's office used video footage to investigate and charge an election worker who altered the completion date on documentation for ballot tabulation accuracy testing.

*Utah Code*³² specifies that an election officer (i.e., county clerk) should ensure that "each part of the processing of all ballots is monitored by recorded video..."³³ This is a change from when a prior *Administrative Rule* allowed for active ballots to be either secured *or* monitored, suggesting clerks did not need to monitor ballots if they secured them. The Wasatch County Clerk was unaware this had changed but reported she could put a temporary camera into the room

³² *Utah Code* 20A-3a-401.1(5)(g)

³³ *Administrative Rule* R623-8-6(2) directs election officials to video monitor in accordance with *Utah Code* 20A-3a-401.1(5)(g).



when it was brought to her attention. As such, the Wasatch County Clerk should do more to fully implement this recommendation.

	2024 Chain of Custody Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
	#2024-20 – 3.2 – We recommend that the counties in which all ballot processing areas are not adequately monitored apply to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor for election funding to purchase the equipment needed to comply with statute.	In Process

3. Wasatch County Should Use Required Security Seals During Ballot Pickup

Wasatch County also did not follow all requirements regarding ballot pickup and intake. *Administrative Rule* requires that election staff fill out two logs when collecting ballots.³⁴ First when they retrieve ballots, and second when they deliver the ballots to the processing center. Those logs should contain such information as the name of individuals collecting the ballots, the time and location of the pick-up, and the seal number used to secure the ballots.³⁵ These logs ensure that staff follow election procedures and that ballots remain secure. Insufficient logs reduce the ability to detect and remedy the mishandling of ballots.

Wasatch County’s logs contained most of this information, but election staff did not use security seals on drop boxes. Thus, Recommendation 3.8 from 2024 is “In Process.” While we did not observe staff tampering with ballots during the pick-up process, security seals increase ballot integrity and security. As such, the Wasatch County Clerk should fully implement the recommendation.

	2024 Chain of Custody Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
	#2024-20 – 3.8 – We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they adhere to all requirements in statute and rule regarding ballot pickup and intake.	In Process

³⁴ *Administrative Rule* R623-8-5

³⁵ Security seals are pre-numbered, tamper-evident seals placed on the bags or containers used to transport ballots. They are used to prevent tampering with ballots while in transit.



4. Wasatch County Can Further Comply with Reconciliation Requirements

Our discussions and observations showed that the Wasatch County Clerk understands how to do ballot reconciliation and completed the final reconciliation following the election. However, while she completed most of the reconciliation process on election night, she did not finalize all the steps required by statute. She did not reconcile all vote histories and did not publicly release reconciliation results until after the election. This falls short of statute, which requires clerks to publicly release reconciliation results each time they tabulate ballots.

Utah Code 20A-4-109(1)

"...an election officer...shall:

Conduct ballot reconciliations...each day on which ballots are tabulated;...

Document each ballot reconciliation;

Publicly release the results of each ballot reconciliation."

Ballot reconciliation is a critical check that can increase confidence that all voters' ballots were accounted for and processed correctly throughout the election. The Wasatch County Clerk can do more to document and release the results of each reconciliation. Thus, the following recommendation is still "In Process" and the county should continue to implement it.

	2024 Reconciliation Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
#2024-20 – 3.6 – We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they understand and follow the ballot reconciliation process in <i>Utah Code</i> 20A-4-109.		In Process

Wasatch County's Reconciliation Process Identified a Double Vote During the Election. Following Primary Election Day, the Wasatch County Clerk identified an instance where a single voter cast both a mail-in ballot and an in-person ballot, resulting in that voter receiving two vote credits. Although some controls exist to prevent this issue, they still leave some gaps. The county processes mail-in envelopes and in-person votes through separate election machines that are not connected. Election workers must manually upload voter data so the machines know who has already voted and can identify double votes. In this case, the



voter cast an in-person ballot, but that vote credit was not uploaded into the mail-in ballot processing machine before the county processed the voter's mail-in ballot. Thus, the machine did not flag their mail-in ballot as a double vote and both ballots were counted.

In our discussions with the Wasatch County Clerk and the LG's Office, they confirmed that this is possible under the right circumstances. Following the election, we did a limited review of other counties to determine if this was occurring statewide³⁶ and identified the occurrence in Wasatch County as the only likely double vote. As such, the Wasatch County Clerk should adjust their election processes to mitigate the window where this can happen.

RECOMMENDATION 3.2

The Wasatch County clerk should adjust their election processes to mitigate the chances that someone can vote twice. This will further strengthen existing controls against double votes.

It is important that clerks are checking for potential double votes during the reconciliation process. This would allow them to address record keeping errors and identify true double voters that may need to be investigated. The LG's Office is aware of these concerns and has reminded clerks to look for them. The LG's Office also reported that it will run its own database report to regularly check for potential double votes and refer them to the appropriate county clerk. Since these efforts are underway, we will follow up on them in future election audits.

5. Wasatch County Can More Fully Follow Candidate Nomination Petition Processing Requirements

In 2024, we recommended³⁷ that the LG's Office formalize processes for candidate nomination petition packets. One new requirement is candidates must provide a summary sheet with contact information for their signature gatherers

³⁶ In other counties, what initially appeared to be double voters were actually record-keeping errors. For example, it may appear that a voter received credit for an absentee ballot and an in-person ballot, even though the absentee ballot is ultimately rejected. Although the ballot is not counted, election officials do not always remove the credit in the database until later, resulting in what looks like double votes. We identified some instances of this happening in several counties.

³⁷ *A Performance Audit of the Signature Verification Process* ([Report No. 2024-16](#)), Recommendation 1.7



when they submit packets to clerks.³⁸ Under the new requirements, clerks must reject packets if the candidate cannot provide the required information.³⁹ Wasatch County accepted multiple packets without gathering the required information on the summary sheets. The LG's Office reports that this information can help investigators contact gatherers who are suspected of fraud. For instance, prosecutors have charged multiple individuals with forging signatures in Utah during recent election cycles. Therefore, missing this information could potentially complicate a criminal investigation.

The county also does not have a policy designating that another elected official audit the signature packets in a conflicted race, as required by *Administrative Rule*.⁴⁰ As a result, it was reported that staff in the clerk's office—rather than another elected official—audited the packets for both candidates running for county clerk. This raises independence concerns during these signature verification audits. As such, Wasatch County should fully implement new requirements related to candidate nomination petition processing to fulfill the intent of the policy.



Election staff—rather than another elected official—audited candidate nomination petition signatures in a conflicted race.

RECOMMENDATION 3.3

The Wasatch County Clerk should learn and execute all processing requirements for candidate nomination petitions as outlined in *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. This will ensure the clerk collects summary sheets with all required information and processes packets in contested races as required in *Administrative Rule*. This enhances independence of the process and can facilitate signature gatherer investigations if needed.

Due to Recurring Noncompliance, Wasatch County Can Better Monitor and Implement Changes in Election Requirements

Noncompliance with election law increases the risk of inaccurate or inappropriate election outcomes. Election requirements set forth in law help safeguard the accuracy and integrity of Utah's elections. Thus, county clerks should diligently learn and implement those requirements.⁴¹

³⁸ *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3(1)(c)(iv)

³⁹ *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3(2)

⁴⁰ *Administrative Rule* R623-12-6(2)

⁴¹ *Utah Code* 20A-1-106(2)



We understand that elections are only one of several duties for county clerks and some clerks face resource constraints.⁴² However, because of the shortcomings we observed, we believe that the Wasatch County Clerk should do more to keep up with changing election requirements. They should work with the LG's Office to identify resources that they may need outside of the current support they receive from the LG's Office.

RECOMMENDATION 3.4

The Wasatch County Clerk should work with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to identify ways in which they need help learning and implementing new election requirements. The clerk should then implement a formal system to learn and implement changes to election requirements. This will help ensure the county's election processes are in line with the most recent election requirements, bolstering the security and integrity of elections.

⁴² In Wasatch County, the clerk has county auditor duties as well.





BACKGROUND

We followed up on recommendations we gave to county clerks in 2024 and reviewed other election processes in San Juan County. While elections are generally sound, the chapter highlights several shortcomings in processes such as chain of custody, reconciliation, and election audits in the San Juan County Clerk's Office.

FINDING 4.1

The San Juan County Clerk's Office Should Better Monitor and Implement Election Requirements

RECOMMENDATION 4.1

The San Juan County Clerk should ensure that candidates meet signature gathering thresholds by reviewing and implementing *Utah Code* 20A-9-408(9)(f). This will help ensure candidates properly qualify to be on the ballot.

RECOMMENDATION 4.2

The San Juan County Clerk should learn and execute all signature verification audit requirements as outlined in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 and the Elections Handbook. Successful implementation will include auditing 1% of each candidate's reviewed signatures and following all documentation requirements, increasing confidence that signature reviews are applied consistently across all candidates and identifying training opportunities.

RECOMMENDATION 4.3

The San Juan County clerk should learn and execute all processing requirements for candidate nomination petitions as outlined in *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. Implementation will ensure the clerk collects summary sheets with all required information which facilitates signature gathering investigations if needed.

RECOMMENDATION 4.4

The San Juan County Clerk should train its poll workers to ensure they can properly update a voter's address. This will ensure accurate voter records and that voters vote in the correct precinct.

RECOMMENDATION 4.5

The San Juan County Clerk should work with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to identify ways in which they need help learning and implementing new election requirements. The clerk should then implement a formal system to learn and implement changes to election requirements. This will help ensure the county's election processes are in line with the most recent election requirements, bolstering the security and integrity of elections.

RECOMMENDATION 4.6

The Legislature should consider whether the current wording in *Utah Code* 20A-3a-401.1(5)(g) should be amended to better guide ballot video monitoring practices. Such guidance would standardize the safeguards around active ballots when they are in between processing steps and reduce the risk of unauthorized access to those ballots.

2024 AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

The San Juan County Clerk should also fully implement Recommendations 1.1, 3.6, and 3.8 from our 2024 elections audit.



CONCLUSION

Noncompliance with election law increases the risk of inaccurate or inappropriate election outcomes. Several of the issues we observed in San Juan County stem from difficulty in keeping up with changing election requirements, including an unawareness or misunderstanding of those changes. As such, we provide several recommendations to address this concern.






Chapter 4

San Juan County's Recurring Election Deficiencies Stem from Implementation and Compliance Challenges

We found that the San Juan County Clerk's⁴³ Office generally conducts elections well and is compliant with recommendations from our 2024 audit. In an office of only three staff, we recognize the substantial efforts required to administer elections, address county-specific election issues, and fulfill the office's other responsibilities. However, we still identified several gaps in following election requirements. As such, the county can do more to implement prior recommendations and address recent changes to election law. In discussing our findings with the clerk and deputy clerk, they expressed their commitment to learn and implement the recommendations in this chapter to further strengthen their election controls. We believe that better implementing previous recommendations and doing more to stay current with election requirements can enhance the county's election processes.



4.1 The San Juan County Clerk's Office Should Better Monitor and Implement Election Requirements

As part of this 2026 audit of Utah's election system and controls, we followed up on prior recommendations from our 2024 audit to measure compliance. The figure on the next page shows San Juan County's compliance with the previous audit recommendations:

⁴³ Although the clerk and auditor offices are combined in San Juan County, we will refer to the election official only as clerk throughout this chapter because that is the role by which they have authority and responsibility over elections.



Compliance With Past Recommendations		
	Post-Election Audit Recommendations Recommendation 1.1 to implement all requirements is <u>In Process</u> . The county is <u>compliant</u> with Recommendation 1.5 to include outside individuals in the post-election audit.	1/2
	Chain of Custody Recommendations Recommendation 3.8 to implement all ballot pickup and intake requirements is <u>In Process</u> . The county is <u>compliant</u> with Recommendation 3.2 to video monitor processing areas and with Recommendation 3.1 to batch immediately.	2/3
	Reconciliation Recommendations Recommendation 3.6 to implement reconciliation requirements is <u>In Process</u> .	0/1

Source: Auditor generated based on our observations.

Beyond previous recommendations, we also wanted to determine whether clerks are consistently implementing new election requirements. We found that San Juan County failed to implement some recent changes to law, despite the Lieutenant Governor’s Office (LG’s Office) providing guidance on these changes in the Elections Handbook. This finding suggests that new election processes are either not fully understood or not being communicated clearly to county clerks.



San Juan County did not fully implement some new election requirements.

As noted in Chapter 1, effective election administration requires county clerks to correctly implement election laws and the LG’s Office to provide oversight to ensure compliance. The following sections describe areas of noncompliance we observed in San Juan County and provide recommendations to improve its processes as follows:

1. Repeated Errors in Ballot Intake Processes Limit the Control San Juan County Has Over Ballots
2. San Juan County Incorrectly Reconciled, Which Can Undermine Confidence That It Accounted for and Processed All Ballots Correctly
3. San Juan County’s Post-Election Audit Was Mostly Sufficient But Fell Short of Some Attestation Requirements
4. The San Juan County Clerk’s Office Did Not Comply With Several Requirements When Processing Candidate Nomination Petition Packets



While these recommendations are directed to the county clerk, we believe additional oversight by the LG's Office can improve the county's understanding of, and compliance with, election requirements.

1. Repeated Errors in Ballot Intake Processes Limit the Control San Juan County Has Over Ballots

San Juan County was not using batch logs in 2024, and we found that this issue still exists. Batching⁴⁴ is one of the first steps in processing mail-in ballots before clerks count and store them. Statute requires the use of batch logs⁴⁵ to track who handles ballots, providing greater control and accountability throughout the process. For example, if ballots are removed from a batch for further review, batch logs provide a record to help election officials trace those ballots back to their original batch.



San Juan County should start using batch logs to provide a record to trace ballots through processing steps.

The San Juan County Clerk reported that they considered using batch logs but decided against them because they only process one batch at a time. This is concerning since the county's current processes do not account for all the elements required on a batch log.⁴⁶ As a result, San Juan County is missing an important control for accountability and tracking of ballots.

Before batching ballots, clerks should document ballot collection from drop boxes and the post office and their delivery to the ballot processing center.⁴⁷ San Juan captured most, but not all, information required on their ballot retrieval and receipt logs. For example, its retrieval log did not note whether election workers looked for tampering or damage to the ballots or the ballot box. As such, we consider the recommendation on the next page "In Process." To fully implement the recommendation, the clerk should both revise the retrieval and receipt logs to contain all required elements and implement batch logs.

⁴⁴ A batch is a group of paper ballots gathered as a group for tabulation and auditing.

⁴⁵ *Utah Code* 20A-3a-401.1(5)

⁴⁶ *Utah Code* 20A-3a-401.1(5) requires that batch logs contain a unique number or code to identify each batch, the number of ballots in the batch, and the date the ballots were received. Each time someone handles ballots in the batch, the log should also show who handled them, when, and for what purpose. San Juan County does not track who handles ballots.

⁴⁷ *Administrative Rule* R623-8-5



 2024 Chain of Custody Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
#2024-20 – 3.8 – We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they adhere to all requirements in statute and rule regarding ballot pickup and intake.	In Process

2. San Juan County Incorrectly Reconciled, Which Can Undermine Confidence That They Accounted For and Processed All Ballots Correctly

The San Juan County Clerk did not include proper numbers when attempting to balance their ballot reconciliation, making the results inaccurate. The clerk could also not explain why the reconciliation numbers did not match, as required in statute. As a result, the reconciliation process did not provide assurance that all ballots were accounted for and processed correctly. Ballot reconciliation is a critical check to ensure that all voters’ ballots were accounted for and processed correctly throughout the election.



San Juan County could not explain their discrepancies in ballot reconciliation.

After observing confusion about reconciliation during our 2024 audit, we contacted the LG’s Office and together introduced San Juan County election staff to the correct reconciliation method. Despite this, the county did not properly reconcile in either the 2025 General Election or the 2026 Primary Election. The county was also unaware and fell short of the requirement to publicly release reconciliation results during the 2026 Primary Election.

While the county did part of the reconciliation process correctly, the errors we observed leave the following recommendation “In Process.” We are concerned that reconciliation has been a problem for three years in San Juan County and encourage the county clerk to work with other election officials to learn and understand how to do it correctly to implement the following recommendation.

 2024 Reconciliation Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
#2024-20 – 3.6 – We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they understand and follow the ballot reconciliation process in <i>Utah Code</i> 20A-4-109.	In Process



3. San Juan County’s Post-Election Audit Was Mostly Sufficient But Fell Short of Some Attestation Requirements

In 2024, we found that there was confusion among clerks about how to attest to their post-election audit results. Even though the LG’s Office clarified these expectations by creating *Administrative Rule* R623-12, San Juan County did not properly implement them. The county clerk fulfilled some of the requirements by correctly performing the audit and documenting its results. However, the clerk did not ensure that both auditors had taken the required training to perform the post-election audit.⁴⁸ The auditors themselves also did not sign an affidavit confirming the results of the audit. As such, our 2024 recommendation for post-election audits is still “In Process.” The clerk should continue to implement this recommendation.

	2024 Post-Election Audit Recommendation	2026 Follow-up Status
#2024-20 – 1.1	We recommend that, as election officials, Utah’s county clerks learn and execute all post-election audit process requirements and procedures.	In Process

4. The San Juan County Clerk’s Office Did Not Comply With Several Requirements When Processing Candidate Nomination Petition Packets

Candidates must meet a required threshold of valid signatures to qualify to be on the ballot through the signature gathering process. Senate Bill 164 (2025 General Legislative Session) requires clerks to certify signatures equal to 110% of the required signature threshold.⁴⁹ The purpose of this requirement is to account for errors that election staff make when reviewing signatures. For example, if staff validated some signatures that they should have rejected, the extra signatures can make up for that error.

⁴⁸ As noted in Recommendation 2.3 in Chapter 2, the LG’s Office and county clerks should clarify expectations for who should take the “Introduction to Ballot Audits” training.

⁴⁹ *Utah Code* 20A-9-408(9)(f) does not always require candidates to reach 110% of the signature threshold. Instead, if a candidate submits fewer signatures, clerks must review all submitted signatures and verify the candidate at least meets the 100% threshold. The key point is not that candidates must always reach 110%. Rather, if the candidate didn’t submit enough signatures to reach the 110% threshold, the requirement is for the clerks to complete a full review of all signatures submitted rather than stop once they reach the 100% threshold.



San Juan County met this requirement for all but one candidate. The candidate likely submitted enough signatures to reach 110% of the required threshold, but the county stopped reviewing them once they reached the 100% threshold. Reviewing the full 110% is an important safeguard to account for verification errors, and San Juan should ensure it implements this requirement. This will help prevent a candidate from improperly qualifying for the ballot.

RECOMMENDATION 4.1

The San Juan County Clerk should ensure that candidates meet signature gathering thresholds by reviewing and implementing *Utah Code* 20A-9-408(9)(f). This will help ensure candidates properly qualify to be on the ballot.

Once election staff finish reviewing candidate signature packets and determine ballot eligibility, a separate reviewer conducts a 1% audit to verify whether staff properly accepted or rejected signatures. Although the clerk's office conducted this 1% signature audit, it only audited signatures from two candidates. Instead, the county should have conducted a 1% audit for each candidate who submitted packets. Not auditing signatures from each candidate can limit confidence that signature verification reviews were applied consistently across all candidates. It also prevents the audit from identifying staff errors and training opportunities, another purpose of the audit. Therefore, the clerk should ensure compliance with all signature verification audit requirements in *Administrative Rule*.

RECOMMENDATION 4.2

The San Juan County Clerk should learn and execute all signature verification audit requirements as outlined in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 and the Elections Handbook. Successful implementation will include auditing 1% of each candidate's reviewed signatures and following all documentation requirements, increasing confidence that signature reviews are applied consistently across all candidates and identifying training opportunities.

The LG's Office also formalized chain of custody processes for candidate nomination petition packets. Under the new requirements,⁵⁰ candidates must provide information about their signature gatherers in a summary sheet when they submit packets to a county clerk. Clerks are supposed to reject packets if the

⁵⁰ *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3(1)(c) and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4



candidate cannot provide the required information.⁵¹ Despite this, San Juan County did not collect all the required information from the candidates. While some information was provided in the packets, not all contained a summary sheet with the full information. The LG's Office reported that this information can help investigators contact signature gatherers who are suspected of fraud. Given that individuals have been prosecuted for signature gathering fraud in Utah, the San Juan County Clerk should fully implement these new requirements to fulfill the intent of the policy.



Signature gatherer information can help during fraud investigations.

RECOMMENDATION 4.3

The San Juan County Clerk should learn and execute all processing requirements for candidate nomination petitions as outlined in *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. Implementation will ensure the clerk collects summary sheets with all required information which facilitates signature gathering investigations if needed.

5. San Juan County Should Train Their Poll Workers To Update Voter Addresses Prior to Casting a Ballot

We observed a gap in poll worker training and understanding of election laws. For example, during voter check-in, a voter informed a poll worker that they had moved. The poll worker incorrectly stated that the voter could cast a ballot tied to their old residence and update their address later. Under state law, this is a scenario where the poll worker could have updated the individual's address. Failing to do so could allow a voter to cast a ballot in the wrong precinct and vote in races for which they are not eligible.

Poll workers play a pivotal, frontline role during elections, interacting with voters and verifying their eligibility to vote.⁵² For that reason, it is important that San Juan County correct this gap we observed among its poll workers. As such, San Juan County should train its poll workers on updating voter addresses. The

⁵¹ *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3(3)

⁵² In San Juan County, some poll workers also provide Navajo translation services. We recognize efforts by the clerk's office to coordinate such translation services across multiple polling sites each election.



county reported that it is already incorporating this into its next poll worker training.

RECOMMENDATION 4.4

The San Juan County Clerk should train its poll workers to ensure they can properly update a voter's address. This will ensure accurate voter records and that voters vote in the correct precinct.

San Juan's Gaps in Understanding and Implementing Election Law Contribute to Continued Deficiencies

As seen in the sections above, the county repeated errors from previous audits and did not fully implement some new election processes. Election requirements in law and rule help safeguard the accuracy and integrity of Utah's elections. Noncompliance with these requirements increases the risk of inaccurate or inappropriate election outcomes. Consequently, we believe the San Juan County Clerk can do more to follow, learn, and implement both existing and changing election requirements.

Some of the new changes that San Juan County missed could have been found in the LG's Office's instructions in the Elections Handbook. Helping clerks stay up to date with election requirements was one of the purposes for the Handbook. The clerk's office reported several ideas on how to better keep up with changing election requirements. We commend them for these efforts. Even so, the clerk should work with the LG's Office to identify resources that they may need outside of the current support they receive to ensure they comply with new election requirements.



Some of the new changes that San Juan County missed could have been found in the LG's Office's instructions in the Elections Handbook.

Referring to Chapter 1 of this report, the deficiencies seen in San Juan County are an example of where the LG's Office could provide more oversight and enforcement to ensure the county is complying with election requirements. We recognize that elections are only one of several duties for county clerks and the San Juan County Clerk's Office has only three staff members.⁵³ Additionally, San Juan County deals with some election requirements that other counties do not, such as coordinating and providing Navajo translation services. The county also reported challenges with verifying addresses and coordinating some election

⁵³ In San Juan County, the clerk has county auditor duties as well.



processes due to the remote nature of the county. Still, *Utah Code* requires the clerk to diligently learn and comply with election requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 4.5

The San Juan County Clerk should work with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to identify ways in which they need help learning and implementing new election requirements. The clerk should then implement a formal system to learn and implement changes to election requirements. This will help ensure the county's election processes are in line with the most recent election requirements, bolstering the security and integrity of elections.

Questions Remain About Monitoring Active Ballots in Vaults

San Juan County properly video monitored all ballot processing steps required by law.⁵⁴ It does not have camera coverage inside the vault where the county stores active ballots between processing steps since the law does not require camera coverage there. We observed multiple people enter this vault alone, giving them direct access to active ballots. While this practice complies with law, and we did not observe ballot tampering, the lack of video monitoring increases the risk of unauthorized access to ballots without detection.

Our 2024 report detailed how clerks differed in their approach to monitoring ballots in their vaults. It recommended that the Legislature consider amending statute to better guide ballot video monitoring practices. While the Legislature considered changes to this section during the 2025 Legislative Session, House Bill 332 did not pass. Since we have observed individuals continue to be alone with ballots in a vault, we again recommend that the Legislature consider this recommendation. The clerk's office indicated it has discussed additional controls to ensure ballots are video monitored between processing steps, regardless of whether the law changes.

⁵⁴ *Utah Code* 20A-3a-401.1(5)(g) and *Administrative Rule* R623-8-6(2)



RECOMMENDATION 4.6


The Legislature should consider whether the current wording in *Utah Code* 20A-3a-401.1(5)(g) should be amended to better guide ballot video monitoring practices. Such guidance would standardize the safeguards around active ballots when they are in between processing steps and reduce the risk of unauthorized access to those ballots.



Complete List of Audit Recommendations

THE FIVE LAYERS OF CAUSE

We developed the Five Layers of Cause Framework to assist leaders in identifying the causes of organizational success and failure. To truly improve as an organization, leaders must understand the causes of major risks. Only when leaders understand these causes and their roots can they make meaningful improvements. Root causes are deeper and more fundamental.



The five layers of cause are defined below. They are ranked from most impactful in organizational change to least. The next page identifies the layer of cause in each recommendation.



GOVERNANCE

The laws and rules that establish the organization's mission, accountability, and funding. Governance empowers the organization with the leadership and resources needed to achieve meaningful results.



LEADERSHIP

The competency and character of the leaders of the organization. Leadership is the decisive force that transforms vision into action and effort into results.




CULTURE

The collective beliefs, values, and behaviors of the organization. An organization's culture can determine employee engagement and morale, willingness to innovate, and quality of product.



STRUCTURE

The policies and standards that guide an organization's work. Structures direct the flow of work and establish what is and is not acceptable.



PROCESS

The steps taken to accomplish a task. Processes are the logistics—the capital, workflows, timing, and practices—that move work along.



Complete List of Audit Recommendations

This report made the following 21 recommendations. The numbering convention assigned to each recommendation consists of its chapter followed by a period and recommendation number within that chapter.

Recommendation 1.1 (Leadership)

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should create and implement a risk-based compliance framework that includes reviews of county election procedures, identifies potential deficiencies, provides recommendations for improvement, and ensures that clerks implement those recommendations. This process will help provide greater assurance that counties are complying with election requirements.

Recommendation 1.2 (Process)

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should work with the Office of Vital Records and Statistics to implement identified fixes that will help ensure the LG's Office receives all relevant death records.

Recommendation 1.3 (Process)

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should refine its deceased voter analysis to identify all potential deceased voters, provide those to clerks for further review, and verify what the clerks did with those potential deceased voters. This will help ensure the accuracy of Utah's voter rolls.

Recommendation 1.4 (Structure)

The Legislature could consider providing specific criteria for election officials to follow when removing deceased voters so that election officials have a standardized approach for reviewing potential deceased voters.

Recommendation 2.1 (Process)

The Utah County Clerk should ensure they and their staff learn and comply with all candidate nomination petition processing requirements and procedures as outlined in ***Utah Code*** 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. Implementing this recommendation will ensure that the county clerk properly reviews summary sheets and rejects any packets that lack required information.

Recommendation 2.2 (Process)

The Utah County Clerk should follow all requirements in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 related to candidate nomination petition signature audits. This should include a written audit policy and the designation of another elected official to conduct audits in a conflicted race. This will help the county ensure that its audits are accurate and enhance independence.

Recommendation 2.3 (Structure)

The county clerks should work with the Lieutenant Governor's Office to clarify who should take the "Introduction to Ballot Audits" training before participating in post-election audits. Successful implementation will be shown with documentation between the LG's Office and county clerks clarifying who should take the training. This will ensure consistency among clerks in applying training requirements.

Recommendation 2.4 (Structure)

The Utah County Clerk should provide standardized guidance for what constitutes proof of residence. Implementation of this recommendation includes ensuring that election staff and poll workers follow that guidance to provide consistent requirements across the county.

Recommendation 2.5 (Structure)

The Utah County Clerk should reinforce in poll worker training that poll workers must complete all necessary tasks for the county's specific ballot reconciliation process. Implementation of this recommendation includes ensuring poll workers complete their assigned tasks at polling locations to help the county reconcile on time. This will foster greater trust and accountability with the handling and processing of ballots, in compliance with election requirements.

Recommendation 2.6 (Process)

The Utah County Clerk should document in its daily reconciliation any reasons why the reconciliation is off, if applicable. Implementing this recommendation will help the county ensure it completes reconciliation on time and transparently reports results with supporting details. This can foster public trust in election processes.

Recommendation 2.7 (Leadership)

The Utah County Clerk should develop, document, and implement a systematic method to learn and follow new election requirements. Successful implementation will include a document outlining the clerk's methods for learning election requirements. They should also execute those methods to help reduce the risk of noncompliance and bolster election integrity.

Recommendation 3.1 (Process)

The Wasatch County Clerk should learn and execute all election audit requirements as outlined in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 and the Elections Handbook. Successful implementation will include properly attesting to the audit results, completing required training, and ensuring a single auditor does not perform the entirety of an audit. Doing so will help post-election audits meet expectations for independence, and address training for those conducting the audits.

Recommendation 3.2 (Process)

The Wasatch County Clerk should adjust their election processes to mitigate the chances that someone can vote twice. This will further strengthen existing controls against double votes.

Recommendation 3.3 (Process)

The Wasatch County Clerk should learn and execute all processing requirements for candidate nomination petitions as outlined in *Utah Code* 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. This will ensure the clerk collects summary sheets with all required information and processes packets in contested races as required in *Administrative Rule*. This enhances independence of the process and can facilitate signature gatherer investigations if needed.

Recommendation 3.4 (Leadership)

The Wasatch County Clerk should work with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to identify ways in which they need help learning and implementing new election requirements. The clerk should then implement a formal system to learn and implement changes to election requirements. This will help ensure the county's election processes are in line with the most recent election requirements, bolstering the security and integrity of elections.



Recommendation 4.1 (Process)

The San Juan County Clerk should ensure that candidates meet signature gathering thresholds by reviewing and implementing **Utah Code** 20A-9-408(9)(f). This will help ensure candidates properly qualify to be on the ballot.

Recommendation 4.2 (Process)

The San Juan County Clerk should learn and execute all signature verification audit requirements as outlined in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 and the Elections Handbook. Successful implementation will include auditing 1% of each candidate's reviewed signatures and following all documentation requirements, increasing confidence that signature reviews are applied consistently across all candidates and identifying training opportunities.

Recommendation 4.3 (Process)

The San Juan County Clerk should learn and execute all processing requirements for candidate nomination petitions as outlined in **Utah Code** 20A-9-408.3 and *Administrative Rule* R623-4-4. Implementation will ensure the clerk collects summary sheets with all required information which facilitates signature gathering investigations if needed.

Recommendation 4.4 (Structure)

The San Juan County Clerk should train its poll workers to ensure they can properly update a voter's address. This will ensure accurate voter records and that voters vote in the correct precinct.

Recommendation 4.5 (Leadership)

The San Juan County Clerk should work with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to identify ways in which they need help learning and implementing new election requirements. The clerk should then implement a formal system to learn and implement changes to election requirements. This will help ensure the county's election processes are in line with the most recent election requirements, bolstering the security and integrity of elections.

Recommendation 4.6 (Structure)

The Legislature should consider whether the current wording in **Utah Code** 20A-3a-401.1(5)(g) should be amended to better guide ballot video monitoring practices. Such guidance would standardize the safeguards around active ballots when they are in between processing steps and reduce the risk of unauthorized access to those ballots.





Agency Response Plan



Office of the Lieutenant Governor



STATE OF UTAH

OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR



DEIDRE M. HENDERSON
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR

September 3, 2026

Kade R. Minchey CIA, CFE, Auditor General
Office of the Legislative Auditor General Utah State Capitol Complex
Rebecca Lockhart House Building, Suite W315
P.O. Box 145315
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5315

Dear Mr. Minchey,

Over the past four years, my office and yours, as well as the state auditor, have come together a total of eleven times to conduct official audits of election systems and processes in the State of Utah. Elections in Utah have never been better due to the hard work and innovation by my staff, elected county clerks and their staff, and recommendations from auditors.

The current audit strikes at the heart of the balance between state oversight of elections, and the actions of independently elected county officials. There are three areas of focus which I will address broadly in this letter and in more detail in the individual responses to recommendations:

1. Balancing enforcement from the Office of the Lieutenant Governor with support and guidance to the county clerks
2. Removal of deceased voters
3. Review of day-to-day operations of three county clerks

Balancing enforcement from the Lt. Governor with support and guidance to the county clerks

Over the past several years, my office has been given increased oversight and enforcement powers over elections. We take these responsibilities seriously. Additionally, each independently elected county clerk has a responsibility to “comply with all...federal and state law, federal and state rules and the policies and direction of the lieutenant governor...” *20A-1-106(2)*. County clerks have never had more guidance, training, support, or oversight from the state government.

During my tenure as lieutenant governor, my office has made great strides in creating training, developing manuals, and providing professional development to each county clerk. This includes a proactive county liaison program which assigns 3-5 counties to a coordinator to be a direct point of contact and source of training and information. The program has been highly successful in developing relationships with individual county offices, which simultaneously allows coordinators to identify and address problems in an atmosphere where clerks and employees can ask for help. Liaisons visit each county on a quarterly basis to provide training, review procedures, and observe election processes such as equipment testing, ballot processing, and audits. These visits have included being present on Election Day to observe polling places.

We endeavor to strike a statutory balance between enforcement and oversight. Thus far, we have built more than a dozen required training modules, created an election handbook, developed a mandatory professional certification program, and helped county clerks professionalize election workers and standardize election processes throughout the state. None of these resources existed prior to my administration.

State statute requires that I provide oversight of elections and when I determine that an election officer is in violation of a law or rule, I “shall consult with the election officer; and may provide training and other assistance to the election officer to the extent the lieutenant governor determines warranted.” *20A-1-105(4)*. If the violations continue, then I am to issue a written order that has the force of law.

Here are some examples of how I have used the enforcement power:

- The former Juab County Clerk was prosecuted and pleaded guilty for violations that our office became aware of, followed up on, and referred to the Attorney General’s Office in cooperation with the current Juab County clerk and former county attorney.
- An election worker in Cache County pleaded guilty to a violation that my office discovered, followed up on, and referred to their county clerk/attorney for investigation. My office also found an unprecedented lack of controls, widespread violations of Utah election law and administrative rule, as well as a pointed disregard for policy and practices established by the Office of the Lieutenant Governor. The (now former) clerk and aforementioned election worker ultimately resigned. Subsequently, my office has followed up on all findings in the Review of

Cache County Elections and found that the new clerk has fully implemented and corrected every finding of the Review of Cache County Elections.

- We have conducted multiple follow-ups with Utah County on the subject of reconciliation (detailed below in the body of the response). This includes phone calls, emails, letters, site visits, a written report, training, and even going in my official capacity to the clerk's physical office to demand the reconciliation.
- We have made special visits to five counties with an additional visit scheduled later this month to review election procedures and provide training due to concerns we discovered during the primary. These special visits are made to consult with the clerk over concerns observed by my office that require substantial correction.

For example: We identified two counties that accepted by mail ballots from voters who did not have signatures on file. Two of my staff visited these counties and asked them to explain how this happened. Both counties went to their physical voter registration files and showed us signatures for the voters. This information changed the visit into a training opportunity to ensure the counties knew how to scan registration records into the registration system and familiarize them with tools they can use to identify voter registrations that are missing images of signatures.

In another county we identified registration issues through our registration audits. We visited with the clerk and outlined the findings of our registration audit and other issues with their registration procedures. My director of elections met with the clerk in their office to outline the findings and reviewed the statutory requirements. My office provided on-site training, instructed them to review all registrations that were processed within a given time frame, and then followed up to ensure it had been completed accurately. We continue to monitor their registrations to ensure they are being processed correctly.

These enforcements are in addition to routine correction and guidance provided during elections or during site visits when non-compliance is discovered.

My office gives careful consideration to the proper balance of state versus local control, trusted working relationships, and a county clerk's direct accountability to the voters who elected them. The addition of stricter state enforcement requirements could lead to the erosion of personal responsibility a clerk has to discharge the duties of their office with fidelity.

Removal of deceased voters

This audit found a total of 45 potential deceased voters on the rolls (25 additional deceased voters were never provided to my office, but were provided to OLAG). None of these deceased individuals had a vote illegally cast on their behalf. This is a marked improvement over the 1,400

deceased voters that were found during the last audit. While the ultimate goal is to get as close to zero as possible, there is a point where being overzealous will disenfranchise voters who may mistakenly be labeled as deceased. My office implemented changes at the beginning of the year, prior to this audit, as well as new procedures in August, in response to this finding, that we believe will get us even closer to zero. In total, my office received notice of 39,845 deceased individuals and removed all but 45 of the registered deceased voters (99.9%).

Additionally, this audit found only two duplicate records for voters out of nearly 2.1 million records. This was also a marked improvement from around 300 duplicates found in the 2024 legislative audit.

Review of day-to-day operations of three county clerks

We have not seen the responses from county clerks, but look forward to their replies as to how they intend to implement the recommendations.

Many of the recommendations for the individual counties are related to reconciliation. While this report shows that these counties struggled with the day-to-day reconciliation during the ballot processing period, each office was able to reconcile their final election certification results. My office has visited each of these counties and given individualized reconciliation training, as well as created trainings and resources regarding this task. These trainings are composed of live virtual meetings, online modules, handouts, and email guidance, in addition to in-person visits to county offices.

Finally, numerous legislative changes each year, along with the unfunded FTE from HB300, makes successful implementation of new election laws a challenge. We would welcome the chance to fully implement new laws and have time to assess their effectiveness before substantial new changes are made. This would reduce both voter confusion and human error, and save taxpayer dollars.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Deidre M. Henderson", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Deidre M. Henderson
Lieutenant Governor

CHAPTER 1

Recommendation 1.1

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should create and implement a risk-based compliance framework that includes reviews of county election procedures, identifies potential deficiencies, provides recommendations for improvement, and ensures that clerks implement those recommendations. This process will help provide greater assurance that counties are complying with election requirements.

Response: The Office concurs that a continued balance of support and enforcement must be sought.

What: The Office will review its current assessment and training program to identify further ways to identify potential compliance concerns in the counties.

How: The Lieutenant Governor will evaluate a risk-based compliance framework and continue to review the balance between enforcement vs support. The Office will weigh any framework against the instructions laid out in Utah Code 20A-1-105.

Under Utah code, when “the lieutenant governor determines that an election officer is in violation of a law or rule” the lieutenant governor “shall consult with the election officer; and may provide training and other assistance to the election officer to the extent the lieutenant governor determines warranted.” 20A-1-105(4) The code goes on to state that if the violation continues, the lieutenant governor shall issue a written order that has the force of law.

The lieutenant governor has done exactly that: consulted with county clerks, followed up with training and resources, and when necessary, issued written orders with the force of law. Some examples include:

- Review of Cache County Elections (2024 covering elections held in 2023)
- Review of Utah County Elections (2024)
- Sought the investigation of and successful prosecution of two election officials (Juab County Clerk, Cache County election worker), with the aid of county officials in both counties.
- Made additional corrective visits to at least five counties to provide correction and additional training. All three of the counties in this audit have had corrective visits. We are currently scheduled to make another visit later this month and will provide training and any necessary corrective action required from that visit.

Beyond that, staff regularly visits each county and when, appropriate, modify training to specific needs in each county. These topics include, but are not limited to, reconciliation, chain of custody, voter registration, ballot processing procedures, reviewing processing and ballot storage areas, etc.

In conclusion, the Office of the Lieutenant Governor will continue to look for ways to proactively identify potential problems and risks in each county.

When: The Office will begin this review as soon as practicable after the November 2026 midterm elections and will complete the review no later than Quarter 1 of 2027.

Contact: Shelly Jackson, Deputy Director of Elections, shellyjackson@utah.gov 801.597.6839

Recommendation 1.2

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should work with the Office of Vital Records and Statistics to implement identified fixes that will help ensure the LG's Office receives all relevant death records.

Response: The office concurs that there were certain death records that were not received. After consulting with the Office of Vital Records, they identified a few reasons among which were: Individuals died outside of the state (65%), data mismatches, and records that were amended after transmittal. We have resolved these issues and will receive more complete records in the future.

What: The office has met with the agency and identified why the missing records were not transmitted.

How: The director of technology in the Lt. Governor's Office has followed up with the Office of Vital Records and Statistics and is conducting a series of meetings with them to address the discrepancies in the reports that their office provided to us. The director has worked to resolve information gaps and prevent future inconsistent reports from this and any other agency and is confident they will be fixed going forward

The Lt. Governor's Office has already extended their follow-up review of deceased individuals from the past year to include the past three years to further catch voters who may not have originally appeared in a file as noted in recommendation 1.3 below.

It is important to note that oversight effectiveness relies on seamless data transmission across state agencies.

When: The Director of Technology in the Lt. Governor's Office will do a follow up analysis with OVRs by the end of January 2027 to ensure that deceased reports going forward include the types of records that were not included in previous reports being sent to the office which led to 25 deceased individuals being on the voter rolls.

Contact: Ali Majid, Director of Technology, alimajid@utah.gov, 801.654.2238

Recommendation 1.3

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should refine its deceased voter analysis to identify all potential deceased voters, provide those to clerks for further review, and verify what the clerks did with those potential deceased voters. This will help ensure the accuracy of Utah's voter rolls.

Response: The office concurs that more oversight is needed to ensure that county clerks perform their statutory duties regarding the removal of deceased voters.

What: The office has implemented new oversight procedures to follow up on county clerks as well as new procedures to review past reports from the office of vital statistics.

How: As of today this has been fully implemented. In January of this year, a full-time staff member was assigned the responsibility to regularly follow up with each county clerk office regarding the removal of deceased voters. This staff member reviews the deceased voters that were assigned to each county and follows up on any that are not subsequently removed. County clerks will need to either remove the deceased individual or give a written reason to the Lt. Governor as to why the individual was not removed. We believe this process will strike the balance between removing all deceased voters and the inadvertent removal of false positives.

In August our office began a continual review of the deceased voters that have been received from the office of vital statistics for the past three years. This will ensure that no deceased voters received from the office of vital statistics will be missed. This will also allow more time for records to be received if they are amended after transmittal.

When: This recommendation is fully implemented.

Contact: Ali Majid, Director of Technology, alimajid@utah.gov, 801.654.2238

Recommendation 1.4

The Legislature could consider providing specific criteria for election officials to follow when removing deceased voters so that election officials have a standardized approach for reviewing potential deceased voters.

This recommendation is to the legislature and we welcome further discussion. The office would like to raise the point that the clerks need flexible guidelines surrounding the removal of deceased voters because this is a complex process. Strict rules that are codified could have the undesirable effect of purging voters that are actually alive and rightfully entitled to vote. The audit itself points out that living voters should not be incorrectly removed due to a vague match. The report identifies that potentially incorrectly removing legitimate voters should be avoided.

This office stands ready to work with clerks and legislators as they consider this recommendation.

CHAPTERS 2-4

Recommendations to clerks:

As to the recommendations made to county clerks, we stand ready to support them in their implementation of these findings. While many of them vary in severity, the findings by legislative auditors of reconciliation issues in Utah County are particularly concerning given the amount of time we have spent trying to get Utah County to reconcile their numbers. These efforts have included emails, phone calls, office visits, training, a visit from the Lt. Governor, a letter with the force of law, and a review of Utah County elections that outlined a similar finding to this audit:

“Finding 1.1: The Utah County Clerk's Office did not reconcile the number of voters who checked in to each polling location with the number of ballots cast.

Recommendation 1.1 The Utah County Clerk's Office must reconcile the number of voters checked in at each polling location with the number of ballots cast at each polling location. Reconciliation must be completed by poll workers at the polling place and reviewed for accuracy by the county clerk's office during the canvass period.

Reconciliation should also occur periodically throughout the day at each polling location.”

In 2025 the Office of the Lt. Governor did a follow-up review of reconciliations for Utah County for both by mail ballots and in person votes and mostly found things in order. We addressed an issue reconciling vote history for voters who had moved. Overall, they performed reconciliation well and to their credit, they were able to successfully complete their final reconciliation. The Utah County Clerk needs to address recurring issues with reconciliation in a manner sufficient that it does not happen again. We will be monitoring Utah County's reconciliation again this November.

Utah County Clerk



September 3, 2026

Kade R. Minchey CIA, CFE, Auditor General
Office of the Legislative Auditor General Utah State Capitol Complex
Rebecca Lockhart House Building, Suite W315
P.O. Box 145315
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5315

Dear Mr. Minchey,

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations in *A Performance Audit of Utah's Election System* (Report #2026-28). We appreciate the need for frequent performance audits of the state's election system and its controls, as they help provide assurance to voters that the Utah Legislature is informed about how the system is functioning.

The vote-by-mail process, as opposed to in-person voting, has added complexity to the election system, but it also offers advantages by making voting more convenient for many voters. To address the complexities of the system, frequent legislative changes must be made to improve safety and security. The challenge for County Clerks is that these changes must be implemented without a trial period. Every year, thousands of temporary and part-time poll workers and ballot-processing staff are hired with limited training and limited budgets. With the addition of 79 pages of new code this year, some human error is inevitable.

While this performance audit is well-intentioned, we feel it went beyond its intended purpose by identifying minor mistakes and creating an environment of contention. It is already difficult to find and retain well-qualified election workers, and this level of scrutiny will only drive more of them away and make it more difficult to hire election workers. We believe performance audits should be used to identify issues that could meaningfully improve systems and controls, rather than nitpicking County Clerks or threatening enforcement actions for minor errors made by humans operating within a complex, ever-changing system. Unless the state intends to invest in automated robotics to implement these processes, performance audits should account for the complexities of the system and recognize that humans are doing their best to carry out these duties without the benefit of trial elections.

Utah County has been, and remains, committed to running elections that are as safe and secure as humanly possible, while also striving to provide taxpayers with the best value for their tax dollars.

Sincerely,

Aaron R. Davidson, Utah County Clerk

Chapter 2

Recommendation 2.1: The Utah County Clerk should ensure they and their staff learn and comply with all candidate nomination petition processing requirements and procedures as outline in Utah Code 20A-9-408.3 and Administrative Rule R623-4-4. Implementing this recommendation will ensure that the County Clerk properly reviews summary sheets and rejects any packets that lack required information.

Department Response: We concur that it is important to properly process candidate nomination petition packets; however, we do not concur that the packets in question during this year's candidate nomination packet submissions were improperly processed.

Explanation: 20A-9-408.3 subsection (1) delineates what the candidate or the candidate's representative shall do to prepare the candidate nomination packets before submitting them to the county clerk's office. Subsection (2) says, "If the election officer discovers" a deficiency, the county clerk is to reach out to the candidate for the missing information. In every instance where we found a deficiency, we first contacted our liaison in the Lieutenant Governor's Office to determine the best way to obtain the needed information. We received verbal instructions indicating that we could look up the information in VISTA and, if the gatherer's contact information was available, we could use that information. However, we did not follow up this advice with written confirmation and, therefore, could not substantiate it to the extent the auditors requested.

Specifications: These deficiencies were found within the first several packet submissions. We reviewed these issues with the respective staff members and provided additional training. Following the verbal guidance received from the Lieutenant Governor's Office, we obtained the necessary information on packet gatherers in every instance. No further deficiencies occurred after the additional training. The circumstances related to this recommendation were identified and addressed during the intake process and had already been implemented before the audit was completed. While the statute does not require election staff to validate the information in nomination packets until they are formally processed, doing so is likely a best practice. For that reason, this process was improved prior to the completion of the audit.

When: The recommended changes were identified by Utah County during the candidate nomination packet intake period and were fully addressed and implemented before the audit was completed.

Recommendation 2.2: The Utah County Clerk should follow all requirements in Administrative Rule R623-12 related to candidate nomination petition signature audits. This should include a written audit policy and the designation of another elected official to conduct audits in a conflicted race. This will help the county ensure that its audits are accurate and enhance independence.

Department Response: We do not concur with this recommendation. Administrative rules cannot create requirements that do not exist in statute; they can only clarify statutes and establish processes to comply with them.

Explanation: The specific rule subsection being referred to in this recommendation is R623-12-6(2), which states:

R623-12-6. Candidate Nomination Petition Signature Audit.

(2)(a) Each county clerk shall develop a written audit policy establishing procedures to comply with Subsection 20A-9-408(9) for nomination petitions where the county clerk is the reviewing officer.

(b) The policy shall include the designation of another elected official to conduct audits of a conflicted race.

Nowhere in 20A-9-408(9) is there any mention of procedures to be implemented for auditing a conflicted race. While discussions occurred in the Legislature about adding such requirements, no statute had yet been enacted. According to the Utah Constitution and established case law, administrative rules cannot supersede statute.

Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1 states,

“The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in . . . a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of the State of Utah; and . . . the people of the State of Utah”

These principles were emphasized in two Utah cases:

“Because the constitution vests the legislative power in the legislature, administrative agencies may only effect policy mandated by statute and cannot exercise a sweeping power to create whatever rules they deem necessary.” *Robinson v. State*, 20 P.3d 396, 400 (Utah 2001).

"Where the legislature delegates to an administrative agency power to make rules and regulations, such delegation must be accompanied by a declared policy outlining the field within which such rules and regulations may be adopted." *Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk*, 96 Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831, 834 (1939).

Specifications: Although there was discussion during last year’s interim session about creating a requirement for conflicted county clerk and lieutenant governor races to have nomination petition packets audited by a third party, no legislation was enacted until SB194 was introduced during the 2026 legislative session. SB194 passed and was implemented on May 6, 2026. Therefore, Administrative Rule R623-12-6(2)(b) had no legal authority prior to May 6, 2026.

It is our position that the Utah County Clerk’s voluntary recusal from processing any nomination petition packets in the conflicted Utah County Clerk race exceeded what was required by Utah statute.

Recommendation 2.3: The County Clerks should work with the Lieutenant Governor’s Office to clarify who should take the Introduction to Audits training before participating in post-election audits. Successful implementation will be shown with documentation between the LG’s Office and County Clerks clarifying who should take the training. This will ensure consistency among County Clerks in applying training requirements.

Department Response: Utah County concurs that the Lieutenant Governor’s Office should

clarify who should take the Introduction to Audits training before participating in post-election audits, though we believe the code is already clear on who is required to complete the training. We do not concur that this recommendation should be included in the Utah County section of this audit.

Explanation: Utah Code 20A-1-107(6) states,

“An individual may not perform an election process for which the lieutenant governor has developed an online training module described in Subsection (3)(b), unless the individual has completed the training module developed for that election process.”

Subsection (3)(b) delineates which individuals subsection (6) applies to, stating,

“The training shall include ... a course designed **for government workers, who perform functions relating to elections**, that consists of modules relating to individual election processes.”

Specifications: Utah County complied with the above statute by ensuring that all government workers in the Utah County Elections Division who perform any election-related functions involved in the post-election audit completed the training provided by the Lieutenant Governor’s Office. Volunteers who assisted with the audit, as required by code, are not government workers, and therefore, according to our reading of the statute, were not required to complete the training. They were given the opportunity to take the training if they chose to, but we did not require it.

When: Utah County will continue to offer the training to post-election volunteers but will not require it unless directed to do so through a statutory clarification or a written rule issued by the Lieutenant Governor’s Office.

Recommendation 2.4: The Utah County Clerk should provide standardized guidance for what constitutes proof of residence. Implementation of this recommendation includes ensuring that the election staff and poll workers follow that guidance to provide consistent requirements across the county.

Department Response: We fully concur with the need for standardized guidance; however, we believe this recommendation should be directed to the Lieutenant Governor’s Office rather than to the County Clerk’s Office.

Explanation: All the county clerks in Utah, and even some staff within the Lieutenant Governor’s Office, have been asking the Lieutenant Governor to systematize and automate the provisional ballot process. Statewide, thousands of poll workers are hired and receive only two to four hours of training before working for a single day. This inevitably creates opportunities for human error, which is what was observed in this finding.

Specifications: According to Utah Code 20A-2-207(5), the Lieutenant Governor was required to conduct a study on the provisional ballot process and provide a “report to the Government Operations Interim Committee on or before October 31, 2020.” Due to the COVID pandemic, that study and report were never completed. Issues with the provisional ballot process have been known for over a decade and have never been fully addressed. The recommendation should therefore be to update this section of code with a current reporting deadline and to require a

thorough statewide review of the provisional ballot process conducted by the Lieutenant Governor's Office.

In the preliminary release of the performance audit, the auditors acknowledged that Utah County discussed the changes in the provisional ballot process during poll worker training, and that instructions were provided to voting locations. They also noted that some voting locations did not have the list of valid voter identifications readily available at their desks for reference. These statements were removed from the final version of the audit.

When: Although the Utah County Clerk's Office believes that a systematized statewide process for handling provisional ballots would greatly improve election operations, Utah County has already updated its poll worker training manual to incorporate this recommendation.

Recommendation 2.5: The Utah County Clerk should reinforce in poll worker training that poll workers must complete all necessary tasks for the county's specific ballot reconciliation process. Implementation of this recommendation includes ensuring poll workers complete their assigned tasks at polling locations to help the county reconcile on time. This will foster greater trust and accountability with the handling and processing of ballots, in compliance with election requirements.

Department Response: While we concur that reconciliations foster greater trust and accountability in the handling and processing of ballots, we do not concur that poll workers did anything wrong in the last election, nor do we concur that their performance had any impact on Utah County's ability to "reconcile on time."

Explanation: When it comes to ballot reconciliation, there is the statutorily required reconciliation process and the additional, self-imposed reconciliation processes Utah County has implemented. The reconciliation process required by law ensures at a high level that all ballots that have been verified have received voter credit or are in the process of receiving credit. That statutorily required reconciliation was completed on time.

Utah County has also implemented a much more detailed reconciliation process that seeks to determine the exact status and location of every single ballot. The vote-by-mail system has significantly complicated this effort. Over the last three years, Utah County has identified 139 ballot classification statuses just within the mail-ballot sorting process. Adding to those the multiple tracking mechanisms for UOCAVA ballots, in-person voting, provisional ballots, ballots needing replication, and ballots requiring adjudication, the system becomes extremely complex to track at a granular level.

The finding that prompted this recommendation involved two poll pads that did not synchronize properly with the State's VISTA system. This synchronization process is supposed to occur automatically, and poll workers should not need to intervene. For reasons we still cannot verify, a system error caused the poll pads to malfunction.

At the end of the night, the required statutory reconciliation, which reconciles all ballots received with voter credit in VISTA, was properly and timely completed.

Specifications: If Utah County had performed only the statutorily required reconciliation and then stopped, this system error would not have been identified at that stage. The auditors did not

discover the issue; it was found because Utah County uses an extended, optional reconciliation process. The auditors observed the issue only because we invited them to review our entire process, including internal steps that exceed statutory requirements. Utah County staff routinely stay long after the statutory reconciliation is complete to perform these additional checks, and this extended process should not be a concern in a performance audit that is intended to measure statutory compliance.

What: Because Utah County identified this system error through its extended reconciliation process, and because it could potentially occur again, we will implement a procedure requiring poll workers to manually synchronize each poll pad at the end of the night. This will ensure that every device properly reports its numbers and will reduce the time required to investigate anomalies

When: This new process will be implemented for the next election in November 2026.

Who: Nicole Stevens, Utah County Elections Director, will be responsible for ensuring this process is in place.

Recommendation 2.6: The Utah County Clerk should document in its daily reconciliation any reasons why the reconciliation is off, if applicable. Implementing this recommendation will help the county ensure it completes reconciliation on time and transparently reports results with supporting detail. This can foster public trust in election processes.

Department Response: We concur that the reconciliation process is important and documenting the results is a key component of the reconciliation process.

Explanation: In Utah County, we create a separate file for each reconciliation we perform. This allows us to retain the file exactly as it appeared on that date and to refer back to each reconciliation individually.

What: In response to this recommendation, Utah County will create a centralized reconciliation file in which all data for each statutorily required reconciliation will be recorded by date. This will allow all reconciliations to be stored in one location and referenced more easily, rather than opening individual files one by one.

When: This new process will be in place for the next election in November 2026.

Who: Justin Blow, Utah County Assistant Elections Director, will be responsible for ensuring this process is in place.

Recommendation 2.7: The Utah County Clerk should develop, document, and implement a systematic method to learn and follow new election requirements. Successful implementation will include a document outlining the clerk's methods for learning election requirements. They should also execute those methods to help reduce the risk of noncompliance and bolster election integrity.

Department Response: We concur that documenting processes generally improve their effectiveness.

Explanation: Utah County printed the new election requirements checklist issued by the Lieutenant Governor's Office. While we used that checklist to verify and mark off the implemented changes, we did not create our own list or document that we would be using that checklist to confirm implementation of the new election requirements.

What: Utah County will create its own list of new election requirements and track the implementation of those changes.

When: Since most changes occur as a result of legislation passed during the legislative session, this requirement will be implemented shortly after the conclusion of the 2027 legislative session.

Who: Because there will be a new Utah County Clerk in 2027, this recommendation will be conveyed to the incoming County Clerk for implementation.



**OLAG Response to the Utah County Clerk's
Audit Response Plan**





Office of the Legislative Auditor General

Kade R. Minchey, Legislative Auditor General

W315 House Building State Capitol Complex | Salt Lake City, UT 84114 | Phone: 801.538.1033

September 4, 2026
Speaker Mike Schultz | President Stuart Adams
Members of the Legislative Audit Subcommittee
450 N State Street Suite N385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Legislative Audit Subcommittee Members,

After receiving the Utah County Clerk's audit response plan, we determined that a response was necessary to address several claims and provide additional context regarding our findings. We briefly explain the Utah County Clerk's objections and our response. While the current clerk will not be in office when we conduct our follow-up, we still expect the subsequent clerk to implement the recommendations in our report.

The Utah County Clerk stated that human error is a part of the state's complex election system. While we acknowledge that human error is a factor in all systems, some of the mistakes identified in this report are repeat errors that appeared in prior audits and that have been made by multiple clerks. That pattern is concerning and contributed to why we reported those mistakes and expect improvement.

- **Recommendation 2.1:** The Utah County Clerk did not concur that they improperly processed some candidate nomination petition packets. Their response plan stated that the Office of the Lieutenant Governor (LG's Office) approved their method for collecting some of the packets. We asked for documentation to validate this claim, but the clerk was unable to provide it. Even so, the county's method to process these packets did not align with statute, which is the standard we used in our observations.
- **Recommendation 2.2:** The Utah County Clerk did not concur with this recommendation. Senate Bill 164 (2025 General Session)¹ gave the LG's Office rulemaking authority for candidate nomination petition signature audits. Statute directs clerks to follow that rule.² Since *Administrative Rule* R623-12 went into effect in October 2025, it is the standard we used in our observations for this audit.
- **Recommendation 2.3:** We found that there was confusion about who needed to take the "Introduction to Ballot Audits" training before participating in a post-election audit. This recommendation therefore focuses on the LG's Office and county clerks clarifying that expectation.
- **Recommendation 2.4:** The Utah County Clerk noted that the language in this section of the report changed throughout the report development process and that certain statements appearing in earlier drafts were removed. We removed those statements because they did not address the issue of confusion regarding proof of residence. Draft reports are confidential, working documents that are refined through the review process. References to language contained in confidential draft

¹ *Utah Code* 20A-3a-106(4)(a)

² *Utah Code* 20A-9-408(9)(e)



Office of the Legislative Auditor General

Kade R. Minchey, Legislative Auditor General

W315 House Building State Capitol Complex | Salt Lake City, UT 84114 | Phone: 801.538.1033

versions of the report do not reflect the conclusions ultimately presented in the final audit report.

- **Recommendation 2.5:** The Utah County Clerk stated that their office completed the statutory reconciliation process on election night. Despite asking for documentation of this multiple times, we never received it and could not verify that claim.

While reviewing the statutory reconciliation process, our discussions and observations with the clerk's office showed that their county-specific reconciliation process may have contributed to mistakes we saw in the statutory reconciliation process. The Utah County Clerk stated that our audits are intended to measure statutory compliance and therefore should not have included this county-specific reconciliation process. That is incorrect. *Utah Code* 36-12-15.2(7) allows our office to audit any practices or procedures that we determine are necessary for a comprehensive performance audit of the election system. As such, we included the county's specific reconciliation process as it appeared to contribute to reconciliation errors.

Sincerely,

Kade R. Minchey, CIA, CFE

Auditor General

kminchey@le.utah.gov

Wasatch County Clerk





Kade R. Minchey, CIA, CFE
Auditor General
Office of the Legislative Auditor General
W315 House Building State Capitol Complex
P.O. Box 145315
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Dear Mr. Minchey,

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the 2026 Performance Audit of Utah's Election System, Report No. 2026-28.

I have carefully reviewed the exposure draft and amended draft that were provided to me. My responses and objections are detailed in the attached Audit Response Plan.

My office recognizes the vital importance of free and fair elections, and the laws and administrative rules that ensure such elections. I echo the amended draft that the shortcomings identified in the audit are relatively minor, but even so I will strive to ensure strong and effective election controls.

Sincerely,

Joey D. Granger
Wasatch County Clerk



Wasatch County Audit Response Plan
To
2026 Performance Audit of Utah's Election System, Report No. 2026-28

Chapter 3

Recommendation 3.1: The Wasatch County clerk should learn and execute all audit election requirements as outlined in *Administrative Rule* R623-12 and the Election Handbook. Successful implementation will include properly attesting to the audit results, completing required training, and ensuring a single auditor does not perform the entirety of an audit. Doing so will help post-election audits meet expectations for independence, and address training for those conducting audits.

Department Response: The Clerk concurs as to the audit participant form and to the training. The Clerk objects to the 1% ballot signature audit finding.

What: The Clerk will update the audit participant form and establish procedures to ensure all required training is completed. The Clerk is in compliance with having more than one auditor conduct the 1% ballot signature audit.

How: The Clerk will review the requirements for the forms for audit participants, and update the County's form as needed. The Clerk will also review the training requirements and coordinate training for the audit participants.

When: The Clerk will implement the form changes and training schedules by the time mail-in ballots begin to be processed for the 2026 General Election.

Recommendation 2024-20-3.2: We recommend that the counties in which all ballot processing areas are not adequately monitored apply to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor for election funding to purchase the equipment needed to comply with statute.

Department Response: The Clerk concurs with the determination that one room did not have video monitoring.

What: The Clerk will ensure that all rooms used for ballot processing have video monitoring equipment.

How: The Clerk will either acquire additional video monitoring equipment or ensure that no room without video monitoring equipment is used in the processing of ballots.

When: The Clerk will implement the form changes and training schedules by the time mail-in ballots begin to be processed for the 2026 General Election.

Recommendation 2024-20-3.8: We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they adhere to all requirements in statute and rule regarding ballot pickup and intake.

Department Response: The Clerk concurs with this finding.

What: The Clerk will ensure security seals are utilized appropriately during ballot-pick up.

How: To comply with this requirement, the Clerk will likely have to identify and purchase new ballot pick-up equipment, along with seals that would be compatible. The Clerk will identify new equipment and a viable seal option, acquire adequate number of seals, train election staff on how to properly use them, and document the use of them as required by rule.

When: The Clerk will implement the form changes and training schedules by the time mail-in ballots begin to be processed for the 2026 General Election.

Recommendation 2024-20-3.6: We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they understand and follow the ballot reconciliation process in Utah Code 20A-4-109.

Department Response: The Clerk objects to the finding that she did not reconcile all vote histories. The Clerk concurs that she did not publicly release the reconciliation results after the election.

What: The Clerk did perform the required reconciliation of all vote histories. The Clerk will ensure that reconciliation results are publicly released each time ballots are tabulated.

How: Post to election website the reconciliation results with other ballot statistics after every tabulation.

When: The Clerk will implement the form changes and training schedules by the time mail-in ballots begin to be processed for the 2026 General Election.

Recommendation 3.2: The Wasatch County Clerk should adjust their election processes to mitigate the chances that someone can vote twice. This will further strengthen existing controls against double votes.

Department Response: The Clerk objects to the recommendation.

Explanation: As mentioned in the Audit, the processing of mail-in and in-person voting is done by separate systems and lags between the two systems are unavoidable. The County is diligent in its reconciliation process and in syncing the two systems. The Clerk's review process was successful in identifying the double votes raised in the audit report. The Clerk did not identify any additional reasonable actions that could further mitigate this risk.

Recommendation 3.3: The Wasatch County Clerk should learn and execute all processing requirements for candidate nomination petitions as outlined in Utah Code 20A-9-408.3 and Administrative Rule R623-4-4. This will ensure the clerk collects summary sheets with all required information and processes packets in contested races as required in Administrative Rule. This enhances independence of the process and can facilitate signature gatherer investigations if needed.

Department Response: The Clerk Concurs.

What: The Clerk will train staff on accepting signature packets. The Clerk will begin the process of working toward a policy for processing signature packets in conflicted races.

How: The Clerk will review the rules for accepting signature packets and work towards ensuring all staff are properly trained on only accepting packets that contain all required information. The Clerk will begin researching and drafting a compliant policy for processing signature packets in conflicted races.

When: By the candidate declaration period in 2028.

**OLAG Response to the Wasatch County Clerk's
Audit Response Plan**





Office of the Legislative Auditor General

Kade R. Minchey, Legislative Auditor General

W315 House Building State Capitol Complex | Salt Lake City, UT 84114 | Phone: 801.538.1033

September 4, 2026
Speaker Mike Schultz | President Stuart Adams
Members of the Legislative Audit Subcommittee
450 N State Street Suite N385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Legislative Audit Subcommittee Members,

After receiving the Wasatch County Clerk's audit response plan, we determined that a response was necessary to address several claims and provide additional context regarding our findings. We briefly explain the Wasatch County Clerk's objections and our response. While the current clerk will not be in office when we conduct our follow-up, we still expect the subsequent clerk to implement the recommendations in our report.

- **Recommendation 3.1 from Report No. 2024-20:** The Wasatch County Clerk objected to our finding that only one person conducted the 1% ballot signature audit. During our audit work, we could not verify that more than one person conducted the ballot signature audit. The clerk did not raise an objection to this finding until responding to the audit, not allowing for any further validation.
- **Recommendation 3.6 from Report No. 2024-20:** The Wasatch County Clerk objected to our finding that they did not reconcile all vote histories on Election Day. During our observations on Primary Election Day, the county did not fully reconcile or post results to the website. We requested documentation from the clerk showing that they did reconcile all vote histories on Election Day. However, we never received documentation showing full reconciliation for that day. While the clerk eventually fully reconciled following the election, their reconciliation on Election Day was not compliant with statute.
- **Recommendation 3.2:** The Wasatch County Clerk objected to our recommendation to further strengthen controls against double votes. They said they could not identify any additional reasonable actions to further mitigate the risk. As we discussed the double vote that happened in Wasatch County with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor, they suggested that a control could be adjusted to minimize the window when a double vote could occur. Specifically, the clerk could more frequently upload a file that helps prevent double votes to their mail-in ballot processing machine. As such, we will still follow up on what the clerk does to implement this recommendation.

Sincerely,

Kade R. Minchey, CIA, CFE
Auditor General
kminchey@le.utah.gov



San Juan County Clerk





SAN JUAN COUNTY CLERK/AUDITOR'S OFFICE

Lyman W. Duncan
Vicky Kuykendall
Vint DeGraw

Clerk/Auditor
Deputy Auditor
Deputy Clerk/Auditor

September 3, 2026

Kade R. Minchey, CIA, CFE, Auditor General
Office of the Legislative Auditor General
Utah State Capitol Complex
Rebecca Lockhart House Building, Suite W315
PO Box 145315
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5315

Dear Mr. Minchey,

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations in A Performance Audit of Utah's Election System – Addressing Recurring Election Control Issues.

Recommendation 4.1 Vint DeGraw, Deputy Clerk, while working with candidates who were gathering signatures, stopped once the signature threshold was met. The Clerk's Office will review all signatures gathered in the future. The expected completion is September 30, 2026.

Recommendation 4.2 Lyman W. Duncan, Clerk, will study the appropriate Utah Code and complete the 1% audit for each candidate's reviewed signature packets. The expected completion is September 30, 2026.

Recommendation 4.3 Vint DeGraw, Deputy Clerk, will study Utah Code and gain the necessary information to perform all processing requirements for candidate nomination petitions. In future elections, he will collect the required completed summary sheets. The expected completion is September 30, 2026.

Recommendation 4.4 Vint DeGraw, Deputy Clerk, has initiated planning for election worker (native and non-native) training to ensure they know how to update a voter's address in the KnowInk PollPad. The training is scheduled for September 29, 2026. The training will include the new Pollprint machines we recently received.

Recommendation 4.5 Lyman W. Duncan, Clerk, is receiving additional training from LG's Office. The LG's Office presented a SE Utah area training on August 27, 2026, for the counties of San Juan, Emery, Carbon, and Grand. The LG's Office was in attendance and assigned election related points to each county to discuss with the group. We received valuable input from our peers and will implement their processes in the areas we are lacking in. The meeting was from 9:00 am to 4:00 pm. In addition, LG's Office had two members come to our county on August 31st and September 1st to help us with document association and to complete the bi-annual county liaison visit. Today we received access from LG's Office for all election trainings developed by them. These were placed in Roundtable along with password codes.

PO BOX 338 - 117 South Main Street - Monticello, Utah 84535-0009 - 435-587-3223 Ext: 4



SAN JUAN COUNTY CLERK/AUDITOR'S OFFICE

Lyman W. Duncan

Clerk/Auditor

Vicky Kuykendall

Deputy Auditor

Vint DeGraw

Deputy Clerk/Auditor

Recommendation 4.6 – Lyman W. Duncan, Clerk/Auditor, I determined that instead of waiting for the legislature to clarify the state code, we purchased an election security metal cage to store the processed, unprocessed, cured, and un-cured ballots. The metal cage is assembled and in our office. To increase security, we have requested another camera to be installed in our ballot processing room. The timeline for the camera install is by the end of September 2026.

2024 Recommendation 1.1 Lyman W. Duncan, Clerk/Auditor, is responsible for learning and implementing all post-election audit processes. This includes identifying elected officials to participate in the election audit, appropriately swearing them in to represent as auditors, adequately training them, and having them sign an affidavit confirming their results of the audit in writing.

2024 Recommendation 3.6 Lyman W. Duncan, Clerk/Auditor, and Vint DeGraw, Deputy Clerk, will implement the correct reconciliation process for ballots received through the mail, ballot boxes, and election day boxes. We understand the step we were missing in the reconciliation process, particularly in reconciling with the Vista registration system. The LG's Office and other Clerks have taught us where in the process we are to reconcile ballots with batches in Vista. In addition, we are implementing better documentation with ballot pickups. The LG's Office has given our office additional flash drives so we can batch by election site, election site box pickups, and by mail. We will also utilize an end-of-day reconciliation report to count all ballots on hand, regardless of their processing status.

2024 Recommendation 3.8 Lyman W. Duncan, Clerk/Auditor, and Vint DeGraw, Deputy Clerk, have implemented steps to comply with the ballot pickup and intake processes. These steps include documentation for ballots received from the Post Office, drop boxes, or on election day ballot pickup. This will include ballot logs, election staff signoffs, security seals, and security tape. Audit to ensure appropriate pre-audit training and post-audit attestations are completed correctly.

Lyman W. Duncan
Clerk/Auditor



THE MISSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR GENERAL IS TO
AUDIT · LEAD · ACHIEVE
WE HELP ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVE
